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Abstract 
 
  
 With disasters increasing in frequency and costs each year, this study seeks to 
explore ways greater public participation could assist emergency managers in their 
mission to keep communities safe.  Specifically this study examines the policy process 
and administrative functions of emergency management to illuminated the benefits and 
hindrances involved in greater participation.  This study conducted a qualitative analysis 
of governmental documents, disaster case studies, international research, as well as 
political science and administrative doctrines, to arrive at its conclusions.  The results of 
this study reveal that the public is a largely untapped resource in the emergency 
management field.  Engaging the public dialogically in early policy stages and 
emergency management phases is essential to successful inclusion for both administrators 
and communities.  Specifically, public inclusion creates expanded knowledge, shared 
learning, personal responsibility, and increased social capital.  Faced with the growing 
threat from disasters, emergency management can create communities that are both more 
resilient and sustainable by increasing public participation. 
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Ch.1 Introduction 
 
Introduction 
 The post- 9/11 environment has resulted in a resurgence of the militarized, top-
down approach to emergency management.  This comes at a time when the nature and 
number of catastrophic risk events, as well as their complexity, is growing, making this 
model even more potentially damaging than in the past.  While first responders and 
traditional emergency management functions remain critical, this thesis seeks to 
reinvigorate interests and action in public participation in the emergency management 
policy process in order to strengthen the capacity of communities to mitigate, prepare, 
respond, and recovery from both natural and man-made disasters.  The  Japanese 
earthquake of March 11
th
 was the fourth most powerful earthquake in history.  The initial 
disaster rapidly cascaded beyond the abilities of a seemingly well-prepared government.  
It created nearly 30-foot tsunami, destroying communities as well as the worst nuclear 
incident since the 1987 Chernobyl meltdown and is estimated to have led to economic 
losses of $309 Billion (United Nations, OCHA, 2011).  The human cost stands at an 
approximate thirteen-thousand confirmed dead, and nearly fifteen-thousand still missing.  
In contrast to the unpredictability exhibited in the Japanese earthquake, the United States’ 
Hurricane Katrina was understood to the extent that President Bush declared a state of 
emergency in the region two days prior to the storms landfall.  The lack of broad 
knowledge, community interaction, and preparation led to a worsening of the disaster.  
The most recent FEMA doctrines on inclusion and collaborative methods, called whole 
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community approaches, still lack an institutionalized role for greater public participation 
(U.S. DHS, FEMA, 2011).  Despite advance knowledge and preparations, approximately 
1,800 lives were lost and Hurricane Katrina became the most costly disaster in American 
history.  
 All disasters have shared the characteristic of being monumentally costly, both in 
lives and in capital.  As the world’s nations grow in population size and technical 
sophistication, the total destructive capability of disasters have also increased.  Natural 
threats can be understood in a continuum including man-made disasters that are chemical, 
biological, nuclear or technological in nature (Posner, 2004).  This continuum has led to 
the professionalization of those in the field of emergency management, who work to 
mitigate, prepare, respond, and recovery from disasters.   
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 The capacity for destruction and the total-stakeholder effect disasters create 
fundamentally threaten contemporary society, because disasters, while geographically 
centralized, have no considerations for political boundaries, administrative processes or 
carefully laid plans (Edwards, 2009; Bowen, 2008; McInerney and Keller, 2008).  
Although all disasters are indeed local, the broad interdependences by which societies in 
developed nations function with, defy the capacities of strictly local emergency planning.  
With this in mind, the U.S. federal government initiated The Defense of Production Act 
of 1950 and has since consolidated efforts in the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency under the Department of Homeland Security (Emergency Management Institute, 
IS-230A).  Based on military hierarchy and top-down management, this organization 
produces the benefits of rapid and rational decision making at the cost of knowledge 
depth and a prepared public.   
 Federal efforts to unify the nation’s response to disasters have not just followed a 
military style of organization, but also a Hamiltonian administrative understanding of 
issue engagement and policy formation (Sylves, 2008).  The Hamiltonian method of issue 
engagement relies on centralized experts working under performance and evaluative 
structures to identify, plan, and execute solutions at the governmental level (Sylves, 
2008).  While this method is excellent for addressing ‘tame’ problems, such as how to 
provide a national highway system, it is less apt at dealing with problems of evolving 
complexity.  Disasters present problems that we may identify as ‘‘wicked’’ because of 
the following characteristics: their nature is not fully agreed upon, context is essential, 
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contain moral ambiguities,  no immediate or ultimate solutions exist, challenge value 
systems, involve a myriad of decision-makers and stakeholders, and in a sense the 
planner has no right to be wrong (Churchman, 1967; Rittel and Weber, 1973).  In sharp 
contrast to the demands of ‘‘wicked’’ problems, Hamiltonian policy approach applies 
narrowly focused knowledge to clearly classified problems for use of centralized 
leadership in a closed-decision making system.   
 While the centralized Hamiltonian approach has been the standard for 
governmental response to disasters, the Jeffersonian model presents an alternative.  Many 
experts now agree that in the future, the world will face increasingly large natural and 
man-made threats, only increasing in cost to our communities (Webster, 2005).  The 
centralized approach to dealing with such threats is suitable for some localized situations, 
but is not as nimble at controlling the cascading effects of large-scale disasters.  With 
costs escalating, budgets shrinking, and authorities strained to the point of collapse; 
disaster stricken neighborhoods, local communities, and towns end up in the hands of 
emergent groups of citizens.  These groups need to be viewed as neither dysfunctional 
nor conflictive, but as inevitable and outside the boundaries of planning (Stallings and 
Quarantelli, 1985).  These citizen groups tend to help retain order, provide for the needy, 
and search for those fallen (Horwich, 1990).  One lesson from Hurricane Katrina was  
when government agencies become inundated, local citizens will organized on their own 
behalf and come to the aid of their fellow citizens.  Rather than conceptualizing the 
public as obstacles to emergency managers, we must ask, should broad public 
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participation be incorporated into the policy process and administration to maximize the 
effectiveness of emergency management?   
Statement of Problem 
 Major, catastrophic threats facing both the nation and the Portland community are 
real, but the fact that they are infrequent and unpredictable make dedicated funding, 
interest, and political movements  difficult to manifest.  One source of public apathy, not 
just in emergency management but in many operations of the government, is the essential 
disconnect the public has with the policy process in general.  This indifference to 
governmental agencies has led to a relatively limited amount of citizen participation in 
activities encouraged by emergency management, activities that would strengthen the 
overall resiliency of a community to disasters.  When people talk about public 
participation, they tend to mean voting, but mere voting is inadequate.  “Participation” in 
its Tocquevillian sense, means the community acts on its own behalf to address concerns 
and solve problems.  This process requires a large segment of politically active citizens to 
work together, which Tocqueville saw as a powerful American quality.  Still, Tocqueville 
was describing America in 1831, well before the centralization and professionalization of 
the federal government.  Since extinguished, the civic republic tradition promoted an 
active citizenry, face-to-face communications and celebrated average citizen 
contributions (Morgan, Green, Shinn, and Robinson, 2008).  Today, the general public is 
removed from the policy process; as expertly trained bureaucrats, agencies officials and 
political actors represent the policy-community, charged with producing policy that best 
fits into existing systems (Birkland, 2010).  This detached policy process has helped 
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breed not just apathy, but also distrust and resentment towards many state and federal 
agencies such as Federal Emergency Management Agency (referred from now on as 
FEMA).   
 FEMA began as the Federal Emergency Management Agency in 1978, and it has 
most recently been under umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security.  This 
agency has its roots in Cold War plans to protect against Soviet conventional and nuclear 
attacks, which is why the organization reflects a military style of hierarchy and 
communication-- good for  battle,  but more difficult to apply to untrained civilians 
during a calamity.  Like the military, this federally funded agency uses its grant writing 
power to promote centralized planning in states seeking funds.  As Frances Edwards 
points out, this degree of central control leaves little room for policy codetermination 
within states and cities, in turn this disengages creative and pragmatic local problem 
solving (Edwards, 2009).  The fundamental disconnect between the local and the federal 
governments produce a dysfunction in shared purpose (following orders to receive 
federal funding versus fulfilling local emergency considerations), just as citizen, 
disengagement undermines preparedness.   
Background and Need 
 There are serious problems for emergency managers in establishing consistent 
connections with the public.  Though information campaigns have come a long way since 
the World Wide Web introduction, they are far from perfect, and the extent to which 
these efforts have been successful will be explored further in this study.  Three primary 
problems still dramatically affect emergency managing and public safety.  First, there is a 
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lack of awareness by the public of the efforts of emergency managers in their respective 
communities.  Second, the policy process is shaped with input from a relatively small 
group of actors creating problems in implementation.  Finally, the centralized 
organizational structure of emergency management has prevented it from entering public 
consciousness.   
 With a public largely unaware of local agency efforts, and because of Hurricane 
Katrina, FEMA has become household name with negative connotations.  In Portland 
Oregon for example, knowledge of the Portland Bureau of Emergency Management is 
sparse, especially considering the unusually high education level (40% of Portlanders 
have college degrees) and education’s high correlation to social capital (Economic 
Research Service, 2012; Putnam, 2003).  In order to carry out successful mitigation 
efforts and comprehensive preparedness measures, the public must be both aware and in 
collaboration with emergency managers.  
 In addition, a lack of transparency in policy process, beginning with community 
concerns and ending with an agency enforcing a new tax or law, can entail a dizzying 
array of political actors, governmental procedures, and closed door negotiations.  The 
policy process at both federal and local levels offer the general public very few areas of 
participation, usually at the issue emergence and evaluation stages, but there are greater 
opportunities.  Possibly the largest failure to surface during Hurricane Katrina debacle 
was the absence of coordination between responding organizations, including; local, 
state, federal governments, nongovernmental organizations, nonprofits, and volunteer 
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organizations; resulting in delayed evacuations and the politically disastrous choice to 
herd people into the Astrodome (Farazamand, 2007) .  This lack of coordination 
illustrates a deficit in communication and participation between even the most involved 
authorities and emergency actors.   
 The final problem related to public participation and emergency management 
concerns the organization of administrative functions.  FEMA’s hierarchical, bureaucratic 
organization creates a rift in knowledge and interaction between the public and managers.  
In order to combat this fissure, FEMA has developed and implemented two outreach 
programs.  The first  is operated through the Citizen Corps, called the Community 
Emergency Response Team  program (referred to as CERT), is facilitated by local first-
responders, and provides citizens with approximately twenty-four hours of disaster first 
response instruction, basic equipment and liability protection (CERT Training conducted  
June 2011).  Subsidized through FEMA, this free program is facilitated by local fire 
departments and emergency medical technicians.  The second outreach program is 
offered by the Emergency Management Institute, and consists of online training 
programs.  While there is no doubt about the value of these training avenues, there are 
limitations to the overall effectiveness of both, to be addressed in later chapters.  
 Despite the efforts of both federal and local emergency managers, these three 
problems continue to hinder the emergency management community in reaching a high 
degree of community preparedness.  This study would like to further understanding of 
public participation in emergency management by answering three corresponding 
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questions.  First, where are the strengths of public participation and where does it detract 
from progress on public policy?  Second, can we identify areas in the policy process that 
public input and direction may actually be beneficial to the goals of emergency 
management?  Finally, where in the emergency management community are there areas 
in policy and administration that are lacking public participation and where its inclusion 
would be advantageous to the FEMA mission?  In light of the changing nature of natural 
and man-made disasters of all types, the question is how emergency management can be 
restructured at both the policy-making and policy-implementation stages in a way that 
brings the benefits of public participation into play while minimizing its shortcomings. 
Purpose of Study 
 This study seeks to explore ways an increase in public participation could help 
administrators combat the danger and costs of disasters.  More specifically, it asks how 
public participation could assist public managers within the policy and administrative 
processes as they work to create more resilient and less vulnerable communities.  This 
study explores the issue internationally, on macro and micro levels across the United 
States, as well as in the community of Portland, Oregon, which has distinctively active 
citizenry and various disaster threats (See Appendix).   
 Today the United States, and cities like Portland, are under threat from  natural 
disasters posing  unnecessarily severe impact on citizens, business, and government 
functions.  To prepare for these inescapable and unpredictable eventualities, policies have 
been based on a Cold War model.  This model subordinates the general public and local 
manager’s concerns to those of national importance.  In place of locally formed policy, a 
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centralized federal plan identifies roles, responsibilities, and contingences that require 
federal manpower and resources.  Emergency management’s efforts have focused 
predominantly on centralized planning of response and recovery while overlooking, in 
many respects, the greatest assets they have against the threat of disasters--a prepared 
citizenry.  Without a broad coalition of public actors, who participate in rather than just 
being informed of emergency management’s efforts, the costs in lives and capital lost to 
disasters will continue to rise.   
 In order to draw out areas of emergency management that could benefit from 
increased public participation, this research explores current and historical foundations of 
civic collaboration and juxtaposes these findings with current emergency management 
organizations.  To do so, the research engaged in analysis of an array of official 
government documents including but not limited to; federal, state and city disaster and 
mitigation plans, Federal Commission reports on Hurricane Katrina, as well as 
participated in FEMA sponsored activities directly involving citizens.  One important 
element of research on governmental documents requires special mention; there are 
prominences of federal mandates associated with the requirements of local emergency 
management grants.  In many, if not most states, at least 50% funding comes by way of 
the Emergency Management Performance Grant, and demands strict adherence to federal 
requirements, which will be further detailed in forthcoming chapters.  A limitation of this 
study is the time dedicated to illuminating the elaborate relationships and collaborative 
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efforts produced by a number of different actors, including tribes, special districts, the 
vast regulatory agencies, as well as county and state governments.   
 Expected outcomes for this study take three different forms.  First, this study may 
provide emergency managers with some useful information regarding the public’s 
potential advantages in implementing disaster mitigation and preparedness policies.  
Directly related, the second expectation is with the increase in the public participation in 
local emergency management there will be an increase in social capital that will pay 
predictable and unforeseen dividends when a disaster does strike a community.  Finally, a 
public active in mitigation and preparedness will be more able to effectively influence 
policy by motivating political leaders.  All three of these expectations would lead to a 
community less vulnerable to, and better prepared for disasters.  A prerequisite of 
including greater public participation in emergency management is an effective and 
capacity rich government, from which greater trust and relationships emerge. 
 This study is primarily concerned with answering the question: what are the 
optimal levels and areas that could benefit from increased public participation in the 
policy and administration of emergency management?  The question will look at 
approximately eight stages of the policy process (issue emergence, problem definition, 
agenda setting, policy formation, legitimation, enactment, implementation, and 
evaluation) as well as the dynamics of modern bureaucracies to see where opportunities 
present themselves.  The proposal here is that emergency management would be 
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strengthened, at local, state, and federal levels, by the adaption of the following best-
practice recommendations: 
(1) Explorative Community Workshops based on United Kingdom models that 
address federal policy monopoly and devolve authority so local input can shape 
federal policy to a greater degree and communities can help shape policy agendas.   
(2) Formative Community Consultations based on New Zealand models that establish 
balance in policy formation between levels of governance; while helping to 
recognize interdependencies and enhance policy understanding.   
(3) Public Mitigation Sessions based on Indian models that expand disaster education 
and build partnerships through direct citizen involvement in risk analysis and non-
structural mitigation efforts.   
(4) Community Tabletop Exercises based on FEMA prescribed activities extended out 
to the greater public; engages community members in practical lessons while 
producing a holistic understanding of threats in managers, administrators, and 
citizens.   
Terminology 
 With the understanding that emergency management, policy and administrative 
studies carry with them terminology  specific to their respective fields, this research will 
now take a moment to define terms that may have ambiguities or contextual notations.  
The definition of disaster carries with it a few different definitions depending on where 
you are within the policy process.  The first definition comes from the Emergency 
Management Institute and provides an operational elucidation on when the efforts of 
FEMA would be initiated: 
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“any natural catastrophe…or, regardless of its cause, any fire, flood 
or explosion, in any part of the U.S., which in the determination of 
the president causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to 
warrant major disaster assistance” (EMI, IS-230a). 
Disasters quantified by FEMA include a numeric understanding that one-hundred 
deaths, one-hundred injuries, and a minimum of one-million dollars in damages 
fulfills their standards for a disaster.  Finally, the supragovernmental organization 
of the United Nations defines disasters as any serious disruption of the functions 
of society to the extent that local peoples, organizations, and government are 
unable to recover with resources at hand.  This study will understand disasters as 
they emerge in a political process, which reacts to causality figures with policy 
shaped by fiscal cost/benefit considerations in order to minimize community 
disruption in accordance with prominent authority’s definitions.   
 Another phrase that may require a further inquiry is public participation.  
Public participation is the degree to which the general public takes an active role 
in shaping the policy that makes modern life possible.  These activities can range 
in their requirements of time, effort, and resources from simply voting to running 
for public office.  Sherry Arnstein’s  “ladder of participation” created in 1969 
specifically outlines the levels of involvement the public has in shaping policy; 
ranging from a maximum of citizen control to the void of citizen manipulation 
(Arnstein, 1969).  The continuum of participation will be explored further in latter 
chapters to determine optimal levels in particular context.   
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 Social capital, as defined by Robert Putnam, refers to the material and 
perceived mutual benefits exchanged between individuals in a densely knit 
network of shared interest seekers (Putnam, 2000).  These connections can be 
brief or long term; vary in shape and size; can have collective and individual 
aspects and finally can have negative characteristics.  These elements and more 
shall be fleshed-out as we explore public participation further.   
  Public policy is typically a governmental reaction to a societal problem 
that is too large for smaller organizations to adequately handle.  Most policy flows 
through parts of, or all, eight stages of the policy process (explained in detail 
later).  Public policy involves the efforts of actors such as elected officials, 
legislators, agencies, as well as private business, corporations, nongovernmental 
organizations, media, and private persons to various degrees.  Activities may 
include organizing disparate individuals, setting agendas, creating goals, 
balancing costs and benefits, and legitimizing decisions legislatively.   
 Inseparable from public policy is public administration, which facilitates 
the implementation side of governmental action, but also actively engages all 
policy processes.  The physical manifestation of public policy denotes  the later 
three stages of the policy process.  These actions include, but are not limited to; 
enactment, implementation and evaluation of policy.  Typically, bureaucratic 
agencies carry out public administration and tend to be focused on efficiency; 
therefore, they are hierarchical and expert based.  The benefits and detriments of 
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administrative agencies will be explored as we investigate the policy process and 
emergency management.  
 Emergency management operates under a four-phase framework, which 
will be a central focus of this study.  The first phase, mitigation, involves efforts 
to decrease the initial impact of a disaster.  The second phase, preparedness, 
describes efforts to decrease secondary impact of post-disaster factors such as fire, 
disease, lack of food, water, and sanitation, which are more detrimental to 
populations than initial impacts.  Third, response describes the short-term 
organizational efforts of authorities to react to a disaster by applying resources 
such as medical teams, the National Guard, engineers, and outside assets to help 
survivors.  The final phase, recovery, involves the long-term efforts to rebuild a 
community.     
 A final term, resilience, has recently gained prominence in the minds of 
public managers and describes an especially dynamic community.  At its most 
basic level resilience is a reference to the speed by which a community recovers 
from adversity or disasters.  One definition of a resilient community comes from 
the Civil Contingences Secretariat of the United Kingdom: 
“Communities and individuals harness local resources and expertise 
to help themselves, in a way that complements the response of the 
emergency services.”  (United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, 2009) 
This brief definition of resilience implies a greater level of understanding that a 
community, in addition to leadership, needs to possess regarding its own 
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capabilities.  This means understanding your street, neighborhood, municipalities, 
and city, not just your country and state.  In order for a community to understand 
its capacity for self-help, it must possess strong internal communication and have 
some intelligible degree of social capital.  Thus, resilience is built from a higher 
degree of general public participation in social activities and policy processes.   
Conclusion 
 Disasters are the most serious challenges to the organizational capacity of human 
endeavors, because they represent uncertainty in three ways.  First, they are difficult or 
impossible to predict.  Unlike other problems we face, disasters never surrender the 
element of surprise and always take the initiative.  Second, they do not recognize human 
boundaries.  This means that the differences between levels and locations of government 
become part of the communication, resource management, and response problem during 
a disaster.  Finally, the impact of disasters can have terrible range.  The minimum 
definition of a disaster rests at one-hundred deaths, one-hundred injuries, and one-million 
in damages caused by a single event like an earthquake.  The cascading  Japanese tragedy 
represents, what many will call, the worst disaster in a generation, and is an important 
example of the uncertainty of disasters.    
 The following chapters will analyze the institutions of emergency management 
and the role the public plays in policy formation.  Chapter 2 describes effective 
emergency management and identifies the key issues.  Chapter 3 considers public 
participation in a policy process, paying attention to the costs and benefits as well as the 
conditions for success.  Chapter 4 surveys the literature and brings together public 
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participation in emergency management, considering both the theory and practice of this 
form of policy process.  The final chapter concludes and notes the concrete next steps to 
increase participation in emergency management.   
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Ch.2 Effective Emergency Management 
 
Introduction 
 Emergency management in the United States has been the focus of shifting policy 
demands and political regimes, producing an institution with subdued initiative, and 
changing policy directions.  The six sections of this chapter will demonstrate an 
understanding of emergency management and public participation through.  First, it will 
explore the history emergency management as it has evolved over the last 60 years.  
Second, it will describe emergency management’s phases and principles, as well as how 
they affect the policy process.  Third, it will examine policy impetus in shaping recent 
emergency management trends.  The fourth section will explore the dynamics of public 
administration, and arrive at some conclusions concerning public participation.  The fifth 
section will detail the lack of public participation in policy process as it manifests in eight 
distinct stages.  What will become apparent is a lack of public dialogue, interactions, and 
participation in all dimensions of emergency management  
History 
 Governmental disaster response has a long but sporadic history in the United 
States.  This chapter will sketch a brief history of the federal government’s attempts to 
become more involved in disaster management since the 1950’s.  The emergence of the 
Cold War fueled fears of nuclear attack, which in turn prompted congress to pass the 
Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 creating the Federal Defense Administration.  Though 
limited in size and staff, this new agency had the power to supersede law, marshal federal 
 Public Participation in Emergency Management  
 
19 
 
resources, and call up personnel during a national emergency, as declared by president 
and regulated by congress (Cohen and Boyer, 1950).  The power of the agency would 
remain relative minuscule, until disasters of the 1960’s created an Office of Civil Defense, 
a sibling agency in the Department of Defense (referred to as DOD).  This new agency 
commanded far greater funding but also shaped policy in defense interests.  It was not  
until 1978 that the Federal Emergency Management Agency would emerge at the behest 
of President Carter, consolidating the risk assessing and disaster management interests of 
100 federal agencies (Haddow, 2011).  Emergency management at the Federal level 
changed many times-over prior to FEMA, and more changes lay ahead. 
 The 1980’s brought renewed fears of nuclear attack as the Cold War inflamed one 
final time by a massive arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States.  
During the Reagan years, FEMA’s mission was obscured by concerns of nuclear attack 
and cleaning up chemical weapons stock piled by the DOD, rather than broad planning 
for disasters.  The agency was in a bureaucratic malaise because funding for technology 
and growth came from DOD, which in turn controlled agency focus.  This changed when 
President Clinton appointed James Lee Witt as director in 1993.  Witt is credited with 
reviving the agency by refocusing programs on mitigation and risk avoidance, while 
helping provide customer-centric interactions with communities and organizations 
(Haddow, 2011).  The new relationships between federal and local officials were 
collaborative in nature, facilitated by citizen engagement, and built long lasting trust and 
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respect.  This new impetus of FEMA would change as a new administration tackled 
threats of terrorism.   
 The massively destructive events of 9/11, and Hurricane Katrina after, had more 
effect on FEMA than any event s in 50 years of emergency management.  Although 
FEMA showed a relatively strong reaction to the events of 9/11 in organizing resources 
in both New York and Virginia, the agency would be subordinated under the new 
Department of Homeland Security (referred to as DHS).  Officially opening its doors on 
January 24
th
 2003, DHS created a bureaucratic net to facilitate greater communication, 
preparedness and security.  In doing so DHS divided FEMA’s primary phases, 
specifically mitigation and preparedness, amongst other agencies, leaving recovery and 
response as FEMA’s primary responsibility (Sylves, 2008).  DHS confronted its first 
great tragedy in 2005 as Hurricane Katrina entered US waters.  Despite, elaborate 
planning, and resource allocation, and an early emergency declaration by President Bush, 
government response was largely a failure.  In fact, Hurricane Katrina took over 1,800 
lives, created an estimated $90 billion in damages, and has required recovery funds that 
the Federal government is still providing (Haddow, 2011).  The Federal government’s 
response to the hurricane led to a congressional investigation and passage of the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006.  This act reaffirmed FEMA’s  
responsibility for mitigation and preparedness phases, provided organizational autonomy, 
elevated FEMA within the DHS hierarchy and allowed the opening of ten regional 
coordination offices (Haddow, 2011).  Today, FEMA is still evolving towards meeting 
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new threats and developing a greater base of knowledge.  These efforts have led to broad 
understanding and reprioritization of the four essential phases of emergency 
management.   
The Four Phases 
 Emergency management, as we have seen, has gone through numerous 
reorganizations and reprioritizations.  Currently FEMA operates within the boundaries of 
four distinct phases; mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery operations.  While 
all phases are essential to the FEMA mission, they are differentiated by allocated 
resources and by level of community involvement.  This section will examine each of 
these phases and place them on a continuum of organizational focus and public 
participation.  With this continuum in mind, we will be better able to understand areas 
within emergency management where greater public participation would be beneficial.   
 The first phase of emergency management, and in many ways connected with the 
final phase, is that of mitigation.  Mitigation can take many shapes, involves all 
community members to some degree, and can be elaborate or very simple.  One very 
basic definition of mitigation refers to a sustained action to reduce or eliminate risk to 
individuals and property by the direct effects of an incident (Col, 2007).  This basic 
definition does not address the deeper complexity of analyzing and defining threats to 
diverse societies.  Mitigation thus involves deciding not only what constitutes risk, but 
also what to do when a risk emerges and how to implement risk-reduction policies 
(Sylves, 2008).  Mitigation necessarily involves long lasting and often permanent 
measures that can take shape structurally in building codes, zoning, and construction of 
 Public Participation in Emergency Management  
 
22 
 
levees.  Efforts may be social as well, focusing on educating the public and business in 
ways to reduce risk by such activities as securing water heaters, bookshelves, and 
cabinets (EMI, IS-230A).  Finally, mitigation involves a wide range of participants 
outside the emergency management community, such as land-use planners, construction 
contractors and building officials, business owners, insurance companies, community 
leaders and average people (Haddow, 2011).  One of the largest examples of mitigation is 
the National Flood Insurance Program legislated in 1968.  The legislation provides 
subsidized insurance for communities in exchange for restricting future development in 
floodplain areas.  A final note on mitigation comes from the Multi-Hazard Mitigation 
Council, for every $1 invested in mitigation activities to reduce disaster loss, $4 is saved 
(Multi-Hazard Mitigation Council, 2005).  Mitigation prevents the catastrophic impact 
from natural disasters, but does not include efforts to protect against secondary threats.   
 Preparedness represents the second phase of emergency management, and in 
many ways, it is also the most isolated within the professional community.  Preparedness 
is the state of readiness needed to respond to an emergency, based on planning, training, 
and exercises (Col, 2007).  According to FEMA, this requires assigning responsibility to 
authorities for emergency actions, resource gathering, as well as planning within a 
jurisdiction (EMI, IS-235b).  As emergency management has evolved, so too have its 
methods of fine tuning preparedness, including implementing a cycle of preparedness 
(Bowen, 2008) which aims at defeating false confidence that can sabotage emergency 
management, while at the same time keeping knowledge cutting edge.  For the public 
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preparedness includes having an emergency plan, a 72 hour kit and being aware of 
special needs that you will have to address during a disaster, such as medical conditions 
and especially vulnerable community members.  Preparedness efforts aim to minimize 
the secondary threats the public faces, such as lack of clean drinking water, food and 
other life sustaining supplies.  
 The third and most dramatic phase in emergency management is that of crisis 
response.  This phase brings to a head the mitigation and preparedness efforts of the 
previous two phases and involves immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and 
meet essential human needs (Col, 2007).  Response is further divided in to five stages; 
alerting and notification; protecting citizens and property; providing for the public 
welfare, and finally restoration of essential functions (EMI, IS-230b).  These five stages 
are orchestrated from the Emergency Operations Command (EOC), which provides the 
logistical, communications, and informational demands which may be required for hours 
or days depending on the severity of an incident.  Central to federal response structure is 
the National Incident Response System, which requires strict compliance from state and 
local authorities in order to receive federal grants.  One stipulation of this arrangement is 
that all responders are trained in the Incident Command System (ICS), which details five 
keys elements (command, operations, planning, logistics, finance) to ensure military style 
efficiency from all active participates (Haddow, 2011).  In addition to this federal 
organizational structure is the careful diffusion of duties to all officials and responders in 
every level of government.  While the duties of authorities are explicit, there is less detail 
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concerning the active role of average citizens.  In most cases, the citizenry is provided 
assistance, instruction, and general updates but has no direct activities within a carefully 
organized disaster plan.   
 The final emergency management phase, recovery, represents the culmination of 
all three previous stages, and in some respects, a new beginning of mitigation.  This 
phase usually starts when threats from both the primary (quake, eruption, and hurricane) 
and secondary events (unstable structures, levees, and nuclear plants) have been 
contained.  This phase involves actions directed at rebuilding lost residential and business 
properties, reconstituting the economic base, and repairing and reestablishing 
infrastructure (Col, 2007).  The enormity of the recovery phase touches the entire 
community and involves the effort of everyone from emergency managers to homeless 
victims.  This is also the only phase where FEMA recommends developing plans with 
“full participation and partnership” of  the community (U.S. DHS, FEMA, 2011).  
Fundamental to recovery are the short-term efforts of returning vital life-support systems 
to a community, including food, water, electricity, roads, and communications (Sylves, 
2008).  With the return of vital systems, recovery efforts that may take months or years 
can begin.  These efforts involve redevelopment and improving the original community 
in a disaster conscious way and influence mitigation efforts, as disaster impacts are still 
salient to community members.  Historically, FEMA has paid an average of $58 million 
per disaster in relief alone, and these numbers are expected to continue rising.  Hurricane 
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Katrina, according to government estimates, will be the United States’ most expensive, 
with an expected relief pay out of approximately $100 Billion (Haddow, 2011). 
Current Trends in Emergency Management 
 Emergency management is not static, and its two current evolutionary trends point 
in an uncertain direction.  The first trend, professionalization of emergency management, 
is establishing accreditation and qualifications based on a disciplinary focus on case study 
analysis and inter-organizational structure.  The second trend further centralizes federal 
authority; this stems from military roots as well as political currents that have 
fundamentally altered the emergency management mission.  This section will illuminate 
the varied ebbs and flows that have shaped the emergency management community, and 
describe public involvement.  
Professionalization 
 What was once the role of fire fighters and ex-military personnel on an ad hoc 
basis, is now transforming into the emergency management profession.  Opened in 1994, 
FEMA’s first somewhat limited higher education program has now reached over two-
hundred certificate and degree programs nationwide.  At the core of the new profession, 
in addition to the four functional phases, are the Principles of Emergency Management 
(human dimension, areas of responsibility, risk assessment process and methodology, 
fiscal dimensions, and promotion of emergency management), which are the basic 
requirements every graduate is expected to understand (Cwiak, 2011).  Of all these 
principles, it is the human dimension principle where we may suspect a focus on greater 
public involvement.  On the contrary, lessons here involve framing disasters, 
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understanding social vulnerability, and how to communicate to the public.  There is 
nothing in the principles referring to the larger community in forms other than as clients 
or potential problems.  In other words, the emergency management education program 
considers the general public a potential problem that needs to be further studied and 
managed.   
 The role that any higher education institution plays in the community is twofold.  
First, it develops, systemizes, and communicates knowledge to those that choose to join 
its ranks.  The second function of a higher education is to promote research, theory 
building, and abstract thinking on subjects.  According to the National Research 
Council’s 2006 report on hazards and disasters, the locus of academic considerations 
have been dichotomized between hazard and disaster research (National Research 
Council, 2006).  The sub-fields of hazard vulnerability and mitigation are joined by 
disaster response and recovery studies.  Where these two spheres of knowledge converge, 
the understanding of disaster preparedness emerges (see figure 1 below).  The primary 
resources employed by researchers are the case studies of particular disasters, originally 
constructed by onsite authorities and other professionals.  Research of this kind produces 
valuable insight into the functioning of agencies and governmental organizations 
responding to disasters, but lacks abstract understanding of the community at large.  This 
missing knowledge is essential to facilitating the complex understanding of disasters in 
sophisticated societies that emergency managers are responsible for.  Rather than 
abstractions and theory, many studies cater to “the occupational competition within the 
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realm of homeland security” that we see so often as agencies struggle to diversify their 
funding streams (Sylves, 2008).  The final principle of emergency management, 
promotion of emergency management, evidences this trend.  Studies of this kind discuss 
organizational response efficiency, specifically on skills and the appropriate bureaucrat 
agencies for different situations.  There is little discussion as to whether the organization 
itself is fully prepared to address the possibility of cascading-disasters as seen in Japan, 
or who will be there if authorities fail . 
 
Figure 1 Core Topics of Hazards and Disaster Research 
 
 The Emergency Management Institute provides an enormous curriculum via the 
internet at no cost to interested parties.  The practical implications of the hundred plus 
classes are not to be discredited, despite their limitations.  Specifically, the Professional 
Development Series, completed by this researcher, exemplifies the over reliance on 
principle and leadership centric programing (EMI, IS-240a).  The seven classes (exercise 
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design, fundamentals of emergency management, emergency planning, leadership and 
influence, effective communication, and developing and managing volunteers) that make 
up this series claim to be a well-rounded set of fundamentals for those in the profession.  
What may be less apparent is the subtle influence on emergency managers this kind of 
education may have.  Leadership promotion and rigid principles diffuses debate and 
critical inquiries in the field, laying an unstable foundation for emergency management 
(Lynn, 1996).  This foundation in practice has led to a prominence of false assumptions 
of preparedness, as seen in Hurricane Katrina, and an inability to adequately deal with 
change, as seen in the case the of preparedness training of health professionals 
(Farazamand, 2007; Hoeppener, 2004).  Emergency management needs a greater balance 
between rigid principles and the more fluid understanding of disasters, arrived at through 
abstractions, theory building, and systemic reviews.   
Centralization 
 For the great majority of American history, emergency management has been a 
local affair, organized bottom-up as leadership and communities deemed necessary.  This 
is not the case today, as more power exists at federal level than ever before.  Two 
intertwined but different factors influence this transition from local to federal power.  
First, the military's role has always been present in response to disasters, where today it is 
present in many other emergency management phases.  Second, the role of federal 
funding has dramatically dominated the implementation of emergency management 
policy across the nation.  While there are many benefits related to the increases in 
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organization and planning capabilities provide by federal involvement, in many ways 
they create distrust, dysfunction and a lack of citizen preparedness at the local level.   
 
Military Influence 
   The Posse Commitatus Act has controlled the role of the military in domestic 
affairs, since the end of the Civil War Reconstruction era.  This act prevents the federal 
military branches from operating domestically without constitutional or congressional 
approval, with one exception.  The National Guard is a governor’s primary resource 
during times of crisis, and it has served as an umbrella emergency management 
organization for 28 states that have few disaster threats (Sylves, 2008).  The ability to 
mobilize the National Guard is a considerable power that provides autonomy during 
incidents at the state and local level, and this has changed.  Hurricane Katrina marked a 
further centralization of federal power, second only to the post- 9/11 reorganization of 
FEMA under the Department of Homeland Security.  Just after the hurricane, President 
George W. Bush announced his desire for a greater role for all military branches in 
disaster activities (U.S. DOD, 2005).  This followed in 2007 by the passing of the John 
Warner National Defense Reauthorization, focusing greater mobilization powers in the 
presidency, at the expense of the governors (Haddow, 2011).  Evidence of this 
centralization was evident in the 2010 Gulf Oil spill, which involved labor and resources 
from the National Guard, Navy, and Air Force.  In terms of manpower and resource 
allocation, the federal government and the chief executive have succeeded in centralizing 
power under a narrower set of decisions paths.  
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 The military, acting at the behest of the federal government, has been more 
influential in shaping disaster policy than in the past.  Since 9/11, DHS has created three 
interlocking guidelines for local authorities during an emergency.  At the top of this 
network is the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which provides specific 
details on five key areas of emergency management (planning, 
communications/information, resource management, command).  The fifth point, 
Ongoing Management and Maintenance, is entirely performed at the DHS and FEMA 
level (EMI, IS-230a).  Connected to and a subordinate of NIMS, is the National Response 
Framework (NRF).  This framework was written for executives, emergency mangers, 
leaders, and nongovernmental organizations.  It emphasizes defining roles for authorities, 
explaining common discipline and structures involved in emergency management.  The 
final organizational tool, the Incident Command System (ICS), dictates action in a 
specific crisis area.  The ICS outlines specific roles, chain of command, and unitary 
authority directions.  What these plans  have three commonalities,  they identify no public 
role, they are completely focused on military style command and control, and compliance 
is directly tied to federal grant funding.   
Grants 
 The omnipresence of the military system of command and control combined with 
greater federal authority in personnel-implementation are imposed through two massive 
DHS grant programs.  The first of these, the Emergency Management Performance Grant 
Program (EMPG), provided almost $330 million dollars in state-matched grants to 
enhance and sustain emergency management systems in 2010 (Haddow, 2011).  The 
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second grant program, Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) carries vast 
implications because in addition to comprising seven primary grants, and a multitude of 
subordinates, this program allocated a total of $1.2 billion to states in 2011 (U.S. DHS, 
2010).  These funds come at the price of compliance with the implementation of NIMS, 
NRF and ICS as well as the training, planning and exercise required for maintaining these 
systems.  Compliance imposed from the federal government left very little room for co-
determination of policy, and left local authorities scrambling to fall into compliance 
(Edwards, 2007).  In many municipalities, the resources introduced by these grants are 
the key funding source, for instance the operating expenses for the Portland Bureau of 
Emergency Management (formerly Portland Office of Emergency Management) totals 
$10.3 million dollars for the 2010-11 cycle.  Of that $10.3 million, approximately $1.7 
million comes from the general fund, while the other 80% is provided by grants (City of 
Portland Budget, 2009).  This level of federal dominance in funding, unique to 
emergency management, provides little room for local agencies to act aggressively on 
behalf of local dynamics.   
 Emergency managers face disasters riddled with unseen local problems and 
complications arising from a relatively disconnected policy process.  During an 
emergency, there are three very powerful drivers that exacerbate destruction, poor 
information processing, isolation during emergencies, and lack of general awareness and 
preparedness (King, 2000).  Emergency management directives centralized at the federal 
level have created a vacuum in local understanding and knowledge leading to failures 
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like Hurricane Katrina.  In addition, within local planning efforts there is a growing 
dependency on federal leadership.  These problems are not without solutions, placing 
greater emphasis on participation at the local level may provide for greater resilience 
throughout the country. 
Conclusion 
 The professionalization of the emergency management community and 
centralization of federal authority represent two powerful trends.  The creation of higher 
education programs and the Emergency Management Institute have succeeded in making 
available valuable information to communities.  Where emergency management has been 
less successful is in the formation of theoretical, abstract and systemic schools of thought 
pertaining to the field.  This has led to strong structured practice, but inflexibility in the 
face of disasters.  The centralization of authority in emergency management has been 
carried out with enormous speed over the last decade, at the expense of the public.  While 
military roots have never been far from disaster policies, the level of influence on civilian 
organization and planning is currently unprecedented.  So too is the level of control the 
federal government wields in funding priorities for its initiatives, frustrating emergency 
managers such as those in Portland,  because they often come with strict stipulations and 
spending requirements (City of Portland, Strategic Plan, 2010).  Taken together, these 
two trends have provided a successful reconstitution of emergency management, but have 
done so without the benefit public participation.  
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Public Administration 
 Public administration represents the last three steps in the policy process 
(enactment, implementation, evaluation) carried out by teams of experts employed by 
bureaucracies.  The bureaucratic organization is designed to efficiently manage, control, 
and resolve two variations of large-scale problems (Carr, 2007).  The first large-scale 
problems bureaucracies face are linear in the sense that priorities are relatively clear, 
ramifications are understood, and interests are addressed, for example, constructing a 
national highway system.  In contrast the second problem type are classified as 
‘‘wicked’’ in the sense that uncertain ramifications, moral ambiguities and conflicting 
interests can produce outcomes worse that the symptoms policy aims to deal with 
(Churchman, 1967; Rittel and Weber, 1973).  To meet these challenges, bureaucracy 
deploys three essential characteristics; clear managerial methodology, centralized 
decisions, and the employment of experts.  This section will explain how these three 
characteristics of bureaucratic administration attempt well-reasoned and efficient 
solutions to problems, without the possible paralysis that could ensue from open 
problem-solving systems.   
Management 
 The modern bureaucratic structure, rooted in ancient cultures such as the Roman 
Empire, blossomed in the post-industrial period.  Fueled by students of organization and 
professionalization such as Max Weber, bureaucracies became responsible for a growing 
number of societal issues such as healthcare and citizen’s economic well-being.  The 
complexity of these issues necessitates the execution of effective management within 
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bureaucratic operations.  One of the most lucid descriptions of proper managerial order 
comes to us from the 19
th
 century Frenchmen Henry Fayol, who produced a theory 
deeply imbedded in our modern culture (Lynn, 1996).  According to Fayol, proper 
management requires emphasis on planning, organization, staffing, directing, 
coordinating, reporting, and finally budgeting (acronym POSDCORB).  The modern 
bureaucracy uses all these to perform and adds; fixed jurisdictional areas, clearly defined 
superiors and subordinates, and ridged standard operating procedures (Birkland, 2010).  
This managerial order creates information streams to leaders so they can make rapid and 
rational choices.  Accountability can be problematic, as levels of understanding in the 
organization are stratified.  As compartmentalized units, no overall understanding of 
intent and ramifications are presupposed but by a small group of well-informed leaders.  
Two challenges to this system come in the way of bounded-rationality and dealing with 
complex concepts like vulnerability.  For the manager leading a bureaucracy, choices 
must be made in a timely manner.  This limitation means that many decisions will be 
made with the understanding that all necessary information is not and never can be 
accounted for.  Vulnerability, understood as elements of our community that will most 
impacted by disasters, are also those that will be less likely understood by a centralized 
and distant manager.  Understanding these limitations, it serves the interest of managers 
to expand knowledge in ways attuned to productive demands.     
Top-down and Bottom-up  
 The decision making model bureaucracies use, a modernized version of Foyal’s 
theory involving the organization, coordinating, staffing, and budgeting of an entire 
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organizational structure is called a top-down model, and this section will compare it to 
the bottom-up model.  Drawing from scholarly work, this research narrowed down eight 
primary emblematic features of the top-down versus bottom-up juxtaposition (Denhardt, 
2000; Thomas, 1995; Birkland, 2010; Carr, 2007).  The top-down model operates as a 
closed-system of ascending information and descending commands.  This functions to 
limit scrutiny, isolate relevant data, and boost rational decision-making.  Internally, the 
compartmentalization, divisions of labor, and stratification of hierarchy prevent a 
comprehensive picture from emerging anywhere but at the top.  Individual operators have 
very little discretion in their interactions with their community, in order to prevent 
dilution of central leadership’s decisions.  With clearly defined goals actuated on expertly 
defined societal groups, leaders take their data and efficiently pass down orders to 
subordinates for implementation.  This decision making process is effective for linear 
problems, but is problematic when dealing ‘‘wicked’’ problems.  
 Some problems that emerge prior to, during and after an emergency may be 
rooted in a top-down policy process.  Problems emerging at the local level and stemming 
from federally dominated policies come in four basic varieties (May and William, 1986).  
First, the “what next?” syndrome accompanies local agents trying to keep up with federal 
programs, which have undergone disruptive shake-ups and reorganizations (such as the 
one done after 9/11 and again after Hurricane Katrina).  Second, the “contamination 
syndrome,” describes the distance created between local officials and federal agencies 
when national efforts go awry or publicly fail.  The third syndrome, the “planning 
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paranoia” effect develops when planning and professionalization reaches dizzying levels 
for local leaders.  Finally, dependency on federal authorities for plans, resources, and 
guidance, leads to a lack of self-help initiatives at the local level.  These four syndromes 
result from of central domination of policy process, which in emergency management  
has proceeded erratically since its inception, with little two-way communication between 
federal and local communities.   
 
Table 2 Top-down versus Bottom-up 
Features Top-Down Bottom-Up 
Transparency Closed System Open Forum 
Discretion Limited Flexibility Facilitates Negotiation 
Direction Policy, Directive, Stature 
Driven 
Policy Emerges by Process 
Mantra Single Message Collaborative Messages 
Tools Rationality for Efficiency Shared Interests and Responsibility 
Interactions Defined Communities Communities Define Themselves 
Goals Clearly Articulated Ambiguous and Evolving 
Labor
 Organization 
 
Internal Divided 
 
Shared Implementation Responsibilities 
 
 Bottom-up decision models, as the table shows, represent a different 
understanding of how managers operate internally and externally.  A bottom-up model 
does not represent a system; rather it represents a kind of mediated forum where 
administrators and different interests collaborate.  Administrators try to help the 
community define the parameters of a problem and potential goals.  Rather than having 
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limited discretion, administrators must have the ability to both share information and 
openly communicate to varying groups.  Instead of depending on the rationality of a 
single executive to maximize efficacy, bottom-up managers illuminate common interests 
and thus encourage shared responsibility.  Administrators take part in the implementation 
of policy in areas where other parties are unable, thus filling gaps in capacities, openly 
and transparently.  The bottom-up model can be slow, but it addresses a far wider range 
of considerations, essential when dealing with ‘‘wicked’’ problems.    
 Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian Approaches 
 The priorities outlined by Foyal’s theory need the top-down bureaucratic 
requirement of expert personnel to tackle problems.  A bureaucracy confronts 
informational problems in two primary forms, which have been attributed to two 
American forefathers: Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton.  As part of the 
POSDCORB model, those that populate the bureaucracies play a significant role in 
planning, reporting, and directing of implementation duties.  The Hamiltonian approach 
to this task, seen in most modern bureaucracies, is closely tied to the top-down decision 
model.  Hamiltonian managers understand problems by aligning experts in the specific 
fields of study with experts of administration, who together define community groups and 
isolate vital information.  These experts eliminate the congestion related to local 
considerations that can make leadership-centric decisions onerous.  Knowledge under this 
regime operates distanced from the actual incidents, and decisions are held accountable 
only after-the-fact (Sylves, 2008).  Finally, this system focuses on the aggregation of 
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useful information, utilized by a small group of leaders with access to the entire body of 
knowledge.  Usefulness, in this context, means information both familiar and actionable 
within the perimeters of the bureaucracy.  For this reason, the Hamiltonian model entails 
an inherent bias towards established powers; vested interests, which are in a position to 
smother unaligned interests (Morgan, Green, Shinn, and Robinson, 2008).  The 
Hamiltonian model allows decision makers to act rapidly, with trusted information 
filtered through expert knowledge and free of perceived irrational elements. 
 On the other side of the spectrum of organizational knowledge, the Jeffersonian 
model of information management relies on sociotechnical skills to a greater degree than 
expert knowledge (Sylves, 2008).  Managers with these skills first empower the public 
and draw from them the contextual realities they face in order to meet their needs.  In this 
approach, managers are held to multi-directional accountability during the process, rather 
than after the policy has either succeeded or failed (Lynn, 1996).  Jeffersonian managers 
are not as reliant on rigidly defined plans because direction is not imposed; rather it is 
created by wide decision circles.  This approach breeds social capital and shared 
responsibility, bother very important prior to, during and after a disaster.    
 Understanding the methodological differences in public administration is essential 
to this study because they represent the dynamics of intergovernmental interaction in our 
country.  At the federal level, obviously, a top-down decision model is in place and 
Hamiltonian concentration of experts creates plans and imposes them on states, cities, 
and communities.  At the local level, leaders are tasked with mediating concerns and 
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helping different groups solve their own problems.  Rather than expert knowledge, 
members of the local community apply their thorough but general knowledge collectively 
to approach policy formation and implementation.  Federally top-down decisions are 
based on filtered data, risk is aggregated across the nation and human life and property is 
quantified.  The local level counterpart perceives the specifics and conditionality of the 
problem as it pertains to the qualitative understanding of the inhabitants.  In many ways, 
the exclusion of local input in shaping federal policy has created a situation where these 
two perspectives communicate past one another (Whitford, 2007).  This has undercut the 
effectiveness of emergency management phases; but also prevented social capital 
development and successful policy creation.   
Public Policy  
 Emergency management, like all government organizations, is not performing its 
designated duties in a vacuum.  Rather, emergency managers are operating in a complex 
public policy process that requires some explanation.  This section will not attempt the 
final definition of a highly debated and contentions aspect of American politics, its intent 
is to show stages, actors and trends that effect emergency management by synthesizing 
four authoritative works (Birkland, 2010; Anderson, 2010; Jones, 1984; Walters, 
Aydelotte, and Miller, 2000).  This section will describe eight distinct policy stages and 
place three categorize of actors in them.  At the top, those with the greatest influence over 
the formation of policy are the executive and legislative leaders of government.  The 
middle tier actors represent the bureaucratic managers and agents who advise the first tier 
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actors and that help implement policy.  Finally, the lowest tier actors are the general, who 
have many passive but few active roles in the policy process.   
To begin with, we can define policy by its essential qualities; it is made in the 
public’s name by government; interpreted and implemented by public and private actors; 
and finally policy is what government intends to and chooses not to do (Birkland, 2010).  
Policy can take many different forms, including distributive, redistributive, regulatory, 
and constituent actions, depending on the desired results (Anderson, 2010).  The process 
by which policy is formed and implemented is the main concern of this section, because 
we need to identify the characteristics of participation.  The eight stages of the policy 
process are as follows: issue emergence, discussion and problem definition, agenda 
setting, policy formation, legitimation, enactment, implementation and evaluation. There 
are many instances where numerous stages are skipped altogether or repeated; the process 
itself is not necessarily cyclic.   
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Figure 2 Eight Stage Policy Process 
 At the top of the national policy process are those responsible for greatest impact 
on policy, the executive and legislative branches.  For this group the responsibly of 
agenda setting, formation, legitimation are combined with answering for enactment, 
implementation and evaluation stages (Anderson, 2010).  Specifically, legislature’s 
command of the agenda-setting stage involves great organizational effort, and requires 
leaders to place parameters on the problem and identify evaluative criteria.  The policy-
formation stage requires leaders to take all considerations and desired results into account 
in policy construction.  The fifth stage, legitimation, occurs when legislatures approve 
appropriations, denote legal responsibility and direct bureaucratic institutions (Birkland, 
2010).  Indeed this group of actors has a high degree of influence on all aspects of the 
policy process. 
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 The second tier of actors, culminating in bureaucratic organizations, has 
significant power concerning the enactment and implementation of policy.  In the 
enactment stage, appropriations and laws manifest in the form of an institution or 
bureaucratic agencies.  The implementation stage begins when an institution or agencies 
implements policy in the form of regulation, taxation and enforcement of those policies.  
This is not the extent of bureaucratic influence on the policy process; they may also help 
shape public opinion, define new problems to solve, and cultivate new resource streams 
(Rourke, 1984).  Finally, in the evaluative phase agencies may push back against public 
and leadership determinations of success or shortcomings of implementation (Jones, 
1980).  Also during evaluation, agency actors may place blame, co-opt rival bureaucratic 
actors, and utilize political systems to further goals.   
 The final tier of actors is the vast and varied public.  This group includes business, 
local leadership, community organizations, media, scholars, and average citizens.  While 
there are examples of this group effecting policy at many stages, their impact is most 
visible at the initial phases of discussion and debate.  The public affects the political 
response to problems as well as influencing the finally stage of evaluation.  In the second 
policy stage, the public may define the problem in terms of what level of government is 
responsible and many problems are solved locally.  The middle stages in the policy 
process are largely void of direct and active public participation, as leadership and 
bureaucratic organizations shape the direction and impact of policy.  The urgency and 
overall consequence of policy, it must be remembered, is also determined by the problem 
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itself, as the USA Patriot Act of 2001 demonstrates.  In reaction to great public fear of 
terrorism, many leaders who previously stood opposed to greater internal security 
measures before 9/11, gladly signed the act (Wedel, 2005).  After 9/11, public outcry and 
fear produced a policy window that had not existed, and allowed for a sweeping national 
effort.  Finally, the public may participate in the evaluation of policy and leaders via 
voting, the initiative and referendum processes, organizing protests or open resistance to 
the laws or regulations that government may implement.   
The Absence of Public Participation 
  Emergency managers today base their discipline on four phases and principles 
drawn from experience with disasters and agency competition.  Professionalization and 
centralization are  two current trends of the emergency management community that are 
increasing their relative power, specialized knowledge and authority at the cost of 
distancing communities, decreasing transparency and accepting incomplete knowledge.  
These trends remove emergency managers from the local community and place them in 
the eight-step federal policy process.  As has been described, policy in emergency 
management is dominated by the executive and bureaucratic agencies.  The prime task of 
agencies such as FEMA is implementing policy, and they have done so by using top-
down management models to maximize efficiency.  What this chapter wishes to compare 
to Hamiltonian methodology is a more inclusive relationship with the public at large in 
order to address ‘‘wicked’’ problems.  After all, it is the public that pays the greatest 
price for errors formed during the policy process.  It follows that they should have some 
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say in policy processes.  In order to better understand this proposition, we must construct 
a far more sophisticated idea of the public and the role it plays.    
 The details provided about the four phases of emergency management are in no 
way exhaustive, but they should provide insight into the complexity of disasters.  A basic 
understanding of the players and tasks for each stage should help us construct a model of 
where the public fits, either as participants in positive activities or as passive recipients of 
information and orders.   
 First, a great number of individuals pursuing governmental, business and safety 
interests actively participate in the mitigation process.  The individual citizen plays a 
passive role as the bearer of costs for codes, building regulations, and zoning for which 
they have a limited institutionalized role in shaping (town hall meetings and public 
outreach do provide at least a public sounding board).  Preparedness is the phase that the 
general public has the least institutionalized role.  In this phase officials, agencies 
members and first-responders are highly active in shaping plans, training, and conducting 
exercises.  In relation to official activities, the public is kept at arm’s length, only learning 
of emergency management activities if they seek out information (made more accessible 
with web-based sources).  The third phase, response shows a small increase in 
institutionalized public participation, but this is still very limited.  The Citizen Corps 
operates the Community Emergency Response Team program, a remnant of the Project 
Impact program.  While this valuable training is available free to the public, according to 
the Citizen Corps, nationally there are only 1,774 local programs out of the 29,262 
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consensus-designated places, or 6% of U.S. communities (Citizen Corps Councils, 2011; 
U.S. Bureau, 2010).  This is a very small percentage in a country of 312 million and 
represents a very low level of public participation in preparedness.  The final phase 
recovery has the highest level of public participation, as communities dealing with 
recovery leave no resource underutilized.    
 One critique of the summary of emergency management phases will be that the 
researcher has ignored the partnerships and collusion with voluntary organizations.  
Indeed many authorities acknowledge the positive role that volunteers provide, and EMI 
has an entire unit concerned with managing volunteers.  The largest volunteer 
organization dealing with disaster is the National Organization Active in Disasters 
(NVOAD), which maintains chapters in every state (nvoad.org).  While these 
organizations are to be celebrated, their role in an emergency needs to be qualified in two 
ways.  First, a disaster is something that, depending on severity, can devastate everything 
of value for leadership and volunteers, only one of which is expected to perform duties.  
CERT training emphasized one vital lesson; take care of yourself and your immediate 
area before you mobilize for larger operations.  In a planning scenario, emergency 
managers must assume volunteers will be part of the impacted group rather than as a 
resource at their disposal.  Second, where volunteers are strong in enthusiasm they are 
weak is sheer numbers and logistics.  According to the federal government, overall 
volunteer rates are just over 26%, which means they are a small force with no dedicated 
means of mass mobilization (Corporation for National, 2012).  The role of volunteer 
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organizations operate on an ad hoc basis and fill in voids in emergency management 
during recovery phases, but are only marginally involved in forming plans in the other 
three phases.   
 The public policy process described above includes many of the stages and actors 
involved over the course of the proceedings, but not all are necessary.  Rather than 
involving many actors, emergency management institutions have been molded almost 
entirely by the first tier actors, predominantly by the executive.  While this tier includes 
legislative actors, they have had less ability to significantly impact institutions due to the 
dispersal of power in their congressional bodies.  One rare example of a significant 
legislative overhaul is illustrated in the 9/11 Commission Report; reporting that 
Congress’s greatest bureaucratic shack-up had happened in 1946 with the Congressional 
Reorganizational  Act, over 65 years ago (National Commission on Terrorist, 2004).  
Opposed to the diffuse powers of congress, which demands greater temporal resources, 
the executive branch can act swiftly to reinvent institutions, especially those under its 
purview.  When a disaster strikes a community, the local leaders initiate a chain of 
command that goes to the state governors and then right to the chief executive of the 
nation, the president.  The decision to provide federal resources is, typically, but not 
exclusively, held by the president alone.  With the president’s discretion, authority 
congressionally approved in 1950, the collective agencies under DHS go into action.  
While keeping abreast of the situation, the president may increase the resources at an 
agencies disposal or even interject the US military, as was seen in the 2010 Gulf Oil spill.  
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Unofficially, congressional leaders may operate to secure greater relief resources for their 
constituents or lobby the president to declare a disaster where the necessity is contestable 
(Sylves, 2008).  While congress controls the purse strings, the president has the power to 
reorder, dissolve, or create new agencies.  Choices that an administration makes may 
reflect larger policy goals or simply serve political ends (Sobel, 2008).  In this policy 
process, the president has an exorbitant amount of power over policy formation.  The 
focus of presidential policy power works in tandem with bureaucratic organizations, who 
decide how programs are implemented and resources are applied.  The role of the general 
public in policy formation is again limited to the first and last stages of issue emergence 
and evaluation.  Both are determined by the uproar created by the general public and 
local leaders, which can create greater political pressure.  In both cases, tension may 
influence policy to a small degree as pressure is distributed over large bureaucracies and 
absorbed by the executive.   
 FEMA’s policy process could be described as driven by a very elite community of 
experts, bureaucrats and elected officials leading a policy monopoly (Birkland, 1997).  
This policy monopoly has already been described as highly focused on disaster response 
and recovery efforts by predominantly distributive administrative tools.  Without a 
thorough understanding of the local environment, this kind of policy drive is problematic 
to community safety and the FEMA mission.  Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the city of New 
Orleans and the state of Louisiana in general, showed a propensity for graft and 
corruption and little penchant for disaster resilience (Boettke, 2007).  The murky political 
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climate, low household incomes, and lack of attractive business environment all 
undermined the community’s ability to mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover from 
disaster.  When FEMA and numerous other agencies initiated their response efforts, 
despite rather strong first-responder preparations, there was little emergency management 
permeating the public as a whole.  With input from local communities, the problems still 
plaguing recovery may have been better understood, and adjustments to federal policy 
could have been made.  Centralized policy process may not just hinder, but also hollow, 
the effectiveness of professional local emergency managers. 
Conclusion 
  This chapter has shown the historical evolution and administration of public 
policy involving emergency management.  The structures and norms visible today reflect 
a process isolated from the public.  At the same time, it has highlighted evidence about 
the costs of this lack of public participation and the potential benefits of reversing these 
tendencies.  However, the policy-relevant questions of when and how to incorporate 
public participation into emergency management in a beneficial and cost-effective way 
remain relatively unexplored.  Diversified preparedness principles are currently receiving 
greater academic attention, although still discounted in favor of response and recovery by 
agencies.  That said focus is shifting away from larger centralized efforts and back onto 
the community.  What these studies miss is an understanding of where resiliency may be 
found in efforts to implement greater public participation into the emergency 
management policy process itself.  Before addressing the specific policy process, we 
must first explore the dynamics of public participation.    
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Ch.3 Public Participation 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter will begin by defining the role of the public in the policy process, 
and describing emergency management interactions.  The second component of this 
chapter will present both the advantages and disadvantages of increased public 
participation, including the ancillary benefit of social capital.  At the core of the pro-
participation debate will be the idea that administrators need to focus on the process, not 
just outcomes of management (King, Felty, and Susel, 1998).  The very nature of 
disasters, as opposed to other public problems, requires a reassessment of wide 
participatory value in emergency management.  For this reason, it may serve the purposes 
of emergency management to embrace elements from a combination of deliberative and 
pluralistic participation models where “the content of a form of life…takes into account 
the generalizable interests of all individuals” in collaborative dialogue (Habermas, 1975).  
This is the case because of the complexity of the problems disaster pose, ambiguities they 
reveal, and the total stakeholder effect they may create.   
Defining the Public 
 Currently there are two contradictory views of the public.  One sees the public as 
a source of problems, and the other the source of solutions.  One of these views is 
ingrained in the foundation of institutional response to disasters.  As has been earlier 
shown, the America that Tocqueville described was one of widespread pragmatic civic 
association.  Over a hundred years later, John Dewey, who identified the “new public,” 
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would eulogize Tocqueville’s America.  The lost public that Dewey describes contains 
four essential characteristics.  First, it is a group that is impacted, for better or worse, by 
the externalities of an activity-taking place in society.  Second, this group comes together 
in association and defines the problem for itself.  Third, these associations create officers 
in which the public operates “in and through” on its behalf (Dewey, 1954).  Finally, these 
officers become representatives in the state, tasked as guardians of custom, social 
understanding and humane ideals.  Well short of the full expression of these four 
characteristics, the ‘new public’ is detached from the institutions it created and has 
become less consequential.  For many in the emergency management and security 
communities this is seen as the emergence of a ‘nanny society’ (Bach and Kaufman, 
2009).  Reluctant government takes a greater role in public affairs where personal 
responsibility and interest have fallen sharply.  The fundamental misunderstanding 
Dewey identified is that when bureaucratic organizations are tasked with solving societal 
problems, their structural detachment contributes the creation of an apathetic and hapless 
public.  This false dichotomy between the public and its managers is not just 
operationally present, but also promoted through our society, until the public reacts with 
anger and distrust to government.     
 The dichotomy between the public and its managers produces, rather than attends 
to, the visible gulf between one group creating problems and another solving them.  This 
simple disunion communicates through society with growing frequency as centralized 
power and expert knowledge gain ascendancy.  For Dewey, the realm of expert 
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knowledge is instrumental to the extent that insights are able to translate understanding of 
a physical condition into a general understanding (Dewey, 1954).  Rather than knowledge 
usage by the few on behalf of the many, knowledge should be something conferred upon 
by all.  Today, we have a public that is simply informed of manager’s decisions.  Their 
consent is implied.  Media, for the sake of brevity, heeds the messages of public 
managers, and promotes authorities as solution providers.  Media’s reliance on public 
managers as a primary information source obscures very powerful societal problems not 
addressed by managers, such as the poverty and inequality that increase the destructive 
potential of disasters (Tierney, Lindell, and Perry, 2001).  Finally, a series of publicly 
directed communications describe the publics subordinated role, solicit it’s acceptance of 
authority, but provides little room for discussion.  
 John Dewey’s definition of the ideal public was in peril or had already passed 
when he published in the 1950’s.  This was due in part to a powerful public management 
apparatus.  The dichotomy that exists between the public and emergency management 
results from a general managerial trend to favor results over process.  This results-based 
choice is not without merit, and indeed, it has provided a powerful impetus for 
organizational continuity.  This initiative has also helped ferment a profound 
governmental disconnect from the public.  Government, once legitimized by the public’s 
name and built from their ranks, has since become unrecognizably bureaucratized.  
Though the public was once involved in defining and framing issues, they are now 
passively provided information via websites, service messages, and alerts.  Without 
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discourse, public knowledge becomes stale and no longer challenges the monopoly of 
expert opinion.  Left to their own accord, the public reacts strongly to problems it 
understands.  In the case of disasters, this is the recovery phase of emergency 
management.  Here, discounting the public deforms the goal of effective policy by 
placing too much focus on the cure of symptoms (response and recovery), rather than the 
prevention of the disease (mitigation and preparedness).  Importantly,  the public is not 
only defined by the role it plays in the larger policy picture, but also by the varied 
interests that make up its ranks, which will be the topic of the following section.    
Advantages and Disadvantages of Participation 
Introduction 
 The public is a very dynamic, diverse, and multidimensional entity, and this 
diversity can create problems for managers who attempt to rapidly create and implement 
policy consistently across the entire country.  Currently these emergency manager’s 
efforts are greatly magnified by funding from the federal government, but this comes at 
the expense of local input, essential to the success in implementation of policy.  Public 
participation in policymaking requires a complex blend of considerations; at a minimum 
balancing stakeholder input and efficiency.  This section will first explore the continuum 
of public participation and then juxtapose two competing theoretical frameworks.  
Second, this section will address both the positive elements and practical applications of 
wider participation.  In order to address potential weakness in public involvement, the 
third section will describe its limits.  Finally, participation will be explored through the 
roots of social capital in the community.  What  will emerge is a picture of public 
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participation that is neither aggrandized nor debased, and hopefully illuminate places and 
times where participation can be successfully increased.   
Theory 
 The role of public participation in the policy process is most commonly associated 
with the right to choose our leaders or vote on initiatives in our communities.  The right 
to vote has expanded its ranks greatly from its historical roots and today includes the 
propertyless, young adults, women, and minorities.  While the right to vote is a powerful 
tool, it also represents a very brief and shallow interaction with the larger political and 
policy system.  This section will explore the continuum of participation; ranging from 
political manipulation to citizen control of political processes.  This section will also 
explore the theoretical and practical considerations involved in deliberative and 
pluralistic models, and recommend a dynamic model for emergency management.   
 As members of Dewey’s public, citizens are expected to have input into decisions 
that relate to the welfare of the community.  The frequency, purpose, and depth of these 
inputs are neither consistent nor universal.  The participatory ladder, devised by Sherry 
Arnstein, divides citizen engagement into three basic groupings describing fundamental 
interactions: degrees of citizen power, degrees of tokenism and finally nonparticipation 
(Arnstein, 1969).  Atop of the eight-rung ladder, citizen control, delegated power and 
partnership, represent a grouping of maximized participation in the policy process.  
Citizen control describes a system in which citizens have full managerial power over the 
policy process.  The subordinate group, tokens represent the middle three rungs of 
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placation, consultation, informing.  In these rungs, citizens are able to listen in on 
leadership discussions and to have a symbolic voice in policy process, but are provided 
no institutionalized ability to influence policy.  At the very bottom of the ladder, the 
therapy and manipulation rungs, describe participation in Machiavellian terms.  Power 
holders espouse wide-participation when in fact decisions are made for the politically 
inconsequential public (Arnstein, 1969).  Arnstein’s ladder, compared to our picture of 
emergency management, reveals that by and large, the federal government has controlled 
policy to the degree of public nonparticipation.  Local leaders excluded from policy-
participation, in turn relegates the public to an informing degree of tokenism.  The 
domination of federal planning and guidelines were intended to ‘cure’ the problem of 
local diversity in dealings of disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.  
At the local level, federal plans have been carried out and the public is provided websites 
and news to inform them of decisions and plans.  This level of public participation is 
consistent with strong command and control system, but lacks even a semblance of public 
consultation, advisory or collaborative efforts; placing participation  on the minimalistic 
extreme of the ladder (Thomas, 1995).  The ladder implies a kind of deceitful and 
malicious intent by authorities, but this is not the position this study takes.  Rather the 
lack of participation was intended to maximize rapid implementation of programs across 
the nation.  This effort was largely effective, but problematic for the sustained mission of 
FEMA to protect the community.  The nature of the policy process as it takes shape 
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between different interests will illuminate some of the reasons the public has been 
exclude from emergency management.   
Figure 3 Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation 
 
Deliberation versus Pluralism 
  Proponents of public participation in the political system come in two definable 
variations; deliberative and pluralistic. As developer of the critical planning theory, 
Jürgen Habermas emphasized deliberation and procedure.  Countering the emphasis on 
deliberation is the pluralistic model described by many authorities, including Michael 
Foucault, who emphasizes contentious discourse between interests seeking power.  These 
two models represent different understandings of how actors interact with one another, 
how equality is considered, and finally how government should be involved.  These three 
elements will be the focus of the theoretical exploration of public participation to follow.   
  Deliberative theory is operationally concerned with three challenges to public 
participation:  inept communication between parties, the problems of inequity, and the 
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role of authority.  According to Habermas, a democratic political system, derived from a 
self-determining society, should construct policy from the fundamental understanding of 
all interests (Habermas, 1975).  To arrive at this ideal policy, stakeholders need to be 
engaged in a procedurally deliberative discourse.  All stakeholders in this participatory 
format are to be considered equal in terms of shaping policy.  Key to stakeholder equality 
and consensus is the idea that, at its most fundamental roots, government is not an apt 
problem solver.  This deliberative ideal, defined by procedural communication, is very 
complex and obviously requires a level of sophisticated information transference that far 
exceeds those of contemporary capacities.  Two practical limitations will undermine the 
application of deliberative ideas in emergency management.  First, there are temporal 
considerations that emerge between disasters that may happen seasonally or over 
decades, which require rapid decisions.  Second, deliberation requires an enormous 
amount of mutual understanding between participants.  Disaster can strike any or all 
segments of society, so creating a comprehensive understanding is too large a challenge.  
For the purpose of this study Habermas’s definition is to idealistic and unpractical, but 
we cannot exclude elements that may help comprise a viable alternative for emergency 
management.     
 Pluralism, as represented in the American political system, stands in sharp 
contrast to deliberative participation in three foundational ways (Silver, Scott, and 
Kazepov, 2010).  First, the pluralistic policy process is primary defined by unscripted and 
unstructured dialogical struggle between competing interests.  Second, recognition of 
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imbalances of power is to understand the inherent condition of human power interactions.  
Imbalances simultaneously provide the impetus for action and temporary resolution of 
conflict by dominate groups.  Finally, government is primarily responsible for shaping 
the solutions to problems by facilitating the conflicts between interest in a civil and 
transparent manner.  The pluralistic model represents a very contentious method of 
arriving at policy decisions by rigorously engaged actors, facilitated by government.  
Pluralism describes conclusions derived from convergences of a “whole order of levels of 
different types of events differing in amplitudes, chronological breadth, and capacity to 
produce effect” (Foucault, 1980).  While examples of pluralism are abound, one question 
persists, how is policy shaped when the issue is not rigorously contested?  Without the 
public in the policy process, the contest is between agencies and political leaders.  Both 
the deliberative and pluralistic models of participatory theory provide us with useful and 
less so elements, so a new model will need to be shaped for emergency management.   
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Table 3 Theoretical Participatory Models 
Deliberative Pluralistic 
Normative Theory Normative Theory 
Stresses Procedure Stresses Conflict 
Direct Democracy Focused Interest Group Domination  
Deliberation is Key to Success Dialogue and Debate key is to Success 
All Parties Equal in Deliberation Power Inequalities always present 
Consensus is Goal Conflicts expose goal 
Government is not Apt at Solving Problems Government Creates Environment for Interests to 
Struggle in Civil Manner 
Procedural Rigidity Reconciles  Some Inequalities 
but Hides Others 
Inequalities Made Conscious by Struggle and are 
Left Unresolved 
Dynamic Participation in Emergency Management 
 Positive Theory 
 Procedure and Conflict Replaced with Informal Institutionalized Participation 
 Public Actors, not Conflicting Interests, are Essential 
 Collaboration Emphasized over Conflict 
 Broad Input, not Consensus or Dominate Ideas, are Necessary 
 Trade-Offs between Inclusion and Efficiency Taken as Self-Evident 
 Dialogue in which Everyone is Allotted Equal Input 
 Government Facilitates Openness, Dialogue and Transparent Decision Making 
 Alleviating Inequalities is an Element of the Solution  
 
Dynamic Participation Model 
 The limits of the deliberative and pluralistic participation require the creation of a 
more ample model for addressing the goals of emergency managers.  Essential elements 
of this new model include; collaborative dialogue, equal opportunity for input, and 
government facilitation of dialogue.  First, Nancy C Roberts describes dialogue as 
involving the fleshing-out of mutual concerns which intern builds relationships (Roberts, 
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2002).  This is less directed and ordered than deliberation, while not involving conflict 
between interests.  Standard rules guiding deliberation and debate are not employed 
because proper two-way dialogue must operate free of overtly coercive structures and 
procedures (Roberts, 2002).  Each participant is equal in as far as his or her concerns are 
expressed in relation to the primary topic, with the goal of shared learning.  Facilitators 
establish a primary topic, but the meanings and assumptions are left to the participants to 
extrapolate dialogically.  Rather than dominate-interests groups defining policy, each 
stakeholder has an equal opportunity to express their position for consideration, without a 
necessarily equal impact on final policy.  Practical communication between individuals, 
carried out to align goals and interests, can be operationalized in an undominated 
approach to dialogue (Mantysalo, 2002).  The policy process in this regard shifts from 
essentially contentious to collaborative as participants come to understand mutual 
interests and concerns.  In this theoretical atmosphere, where the ridged roles played by 
authorities and citizens are dulled, dialogue can widen the knowledge-realm concerning 
community and individual responsibility.  Rather than being inept, as maintained by 
deliberative theory, government orchestrates public participation processes in four 
primary ways: issue or situation, administrative systems, administrators, and finally the 
citizens themselves (King, Felty, and Susel, 1998).  Dialogue shapes policy and 
understanding which is then used by authorities and leaders to construct policy.  The 
current FEMA Whole Community Approach initiated in December of 2011 was 
constructed from a collage of different methods, including conferences, seminars, 
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professional meetings, practitioner gatherings, and official government meetings (U.S. 
DHS, FEMA, 2011).  What is missing, and essential to the effort, is an institutionalized 
space for dialogue.  While gathering information from various sources is important, 
giving the community a space at the table is the only way to create personal responsibly, 
social capital, and a prepared community.   
  The practical playing field of emergency management is where the theoretical 
idea of dynamic participation colludes with our understanding that no interactions are 
without miscommunication and error.  Both deliberative and pluralistic models contain 
elements that will dilute the capacity of collaborative efforts to strengthen emergency 
management policy.  Problems emerge from intergroup communication trends, 
technocratic language, and procedural intolerance.  Looking at the citizens themselves, 
we see institutional barriers that come in the form of authority gatekeeping, formal 
interaction structure and short-term goal orientation (Beresford, 2005).  Barriers such as 
these are most evident when public participation is interjected into the policy process at 
disadvantageous stages.  The following chapter will clarify wherein emergency 
management public participation is best suited.  Without proper consideration, these 
barriers will prevent constructive communication, even when the institution has been 
shaped primarily to facilitate wider participation.  For the public to contribute positively 
to policy processes an understanding of their weaknesses and strengths will require 
further examination.   
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Advantages 
 As a blanket concept, increasing public participation in government is not one that 
this study is prepared to posit.  Rather, increases in public participation in certain areas of 
emergency management and at certain policy stages, will increase overall community 
safety.  Before we can identify where those areas in the emergency management phases 
and policy process are, we must understand the advantages of public participation.  
Defined in light of the basic demands of the bureaucratic model, efficiency of rational 
decisions and quality information, participation offers many benefits.  In addition, 
participation may also sponsor a swell in community engagement in the form of social 
capital.   
 Modern society requires information provided by technical, organizational, and 
scientific experts.  With this in mind, the benefits of information provided by public 
participation must be addressed in relation to disasters.  The first advantage emerges 
when the public is tapped to clarify the ambiguities that define “wicked” problems 
(Thomas, 1995).  These ambiguities include the moral dilemmas that emerge during a 
disaster, for example whether resources are to be allocated in a utilitarian manner or 
prioritize for special groups.  For those concerned, CERT training was wholly utilitarian, 
especially as far as triage and treatment efforts were concerned.  Second, the public is the 
only body capable of considering the vast variables needed to arrive at holistic 
perspective, which is essential when dealing society wide disasters.  When utilized, this 
holistic view has been shown to produce and improve substantive decision quality as well 
as providing “thick” descriptions of risk (Berele and Crayford, 2002; Horlick and Jones, 
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2009).  The third benefit involves the contextual references that local knowledge 
maintains, including very specific and up-to-date information as well as broad 
generational considerations (Innes and Booher, 2010).  The fourth informational benefit 
accrued by the inclusion of the public in policy processes is the emergence of an educated 
public.  As has already been demonstrated, a post-disaster public unaware of the full 
spectrum of policy options will focus on familiar recovery efforts; at the expense of what 
maybe the more rational efforts of mitigation and preparedness (Irvin and Stansbury, 
2004).  Finally, by including all stakeholders into the policy process, managers encourage 
citizen involvement in the community at large.  This can pay unforeseen dividends to 
policy makers as they look to enact, implement, and enforce directives.  The 
informational benefits noted here are those that emerge from a dialogue between 
community and mangers, which ultimately lend themselves to greater over all 
governmental efficiency. 
 The role of the public in policy process can provide informational benefits to 
mangers, but there are other situational benefits.  First, while the public can clarify 
ambiguities, it can also break decision gridlocks and mediate powerful interests, as will 
be explored in chapter 4 (Pearce, 2003).  Second, governments may avoid litigation if 
they share responsibly of decision-making with the public.  The third benefit comes in the 
form of more comprehensive implementation, which manifests from a collective 
agreement on regulation or laws to be administered.  When the public communally 
agrees, there is less overall resistance to implementation.  Another benefit emerges 
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concerning the extent to which administrators and politicians are able to appeal to the 
larger community for support.  This may involve administrators mobilizing the public to 
pressure politicians for greater resources, or politicians mobilizing the citizenry to 
pressure administrators for greater efficiency.  Finally, the government would benefit 
from an increase in the trust that would emerge with swell in governmental transparency 
(Irvin and Stansbury, 2004).  These five factors are by no means exhaustive, but they do 
represent areas where the public could benefit bureaucrats’ most stringent requirements: 
efficiently, rational decision-making and quality information.   
Social Capital 
 Social capital represents an ancillary benefit emerging from a community that 
contributes to the policy process.  This section will begin by defining social capital and 
illuminating some of its positive and negative elements.  Second, this section will explore 
examples where social capital benefited a community, as well as the where social capital 
is best vested.  Finally, this section will look at where government has failed to capitalize 
on social capital and how this may be corrected.  For any community that goes through 
growth and change, social capital is a valuable resource, but for those in a disaster it can 
literally save lives.   
 At the very heart of the term social capital lay an understanding that social 
networks have some inherent value for those participating in them.  This understanding is 
closely related to what many call civic virtue, but on a wider more diverse scale.  At a 
general level, these benefits emerge from the trust created through reciprocity, 
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information sharing, and cooperation (Sagurao Seminar, 2000).  These activities 
converge in a community, transforming the ‘I’ mentality to a ‘We’ mentality.  The ‘We’ 
represents a more robust, resilient and sustainable social atmosphere, worth further 
exploring.  One element of social capital is the positive effects it may have on the 
productive value of an association, by helping its members maximize internal resources 
(such as skills) for the external use on community interests, such as building a library.  
Social capital can have both individualistic and collective elements, depending on the 
nature of the problem.  Reciprocity too has both individualistic (if you don’t come to my 
wedding, I won’t come to yours) as well as general elements (the golden rule for 
example) (Putnam, 2003).  Social capital, because of its nature, is necessarily amorphous 
and can take on formal and informal tendencies.  Obviously, during a disaster, informal 
and unscripted activities would carry the day, and this is where social capital emerges 
most beneficially.  One final definitional element of social capital is its positive or 
negative manifestations.  While social capital is typically beneficial to those inside the 
network, it can be detrimental to those outside, as demonstrated by racial and 
nationalistic groups such as the Klu Klux Klan.  Networks can congregate around 
ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and sectarianism.  These negative examples have been the 
exception, not the rule, in American history.  Associations such as churches, bowling 
leagues, book clubs, cancer support groups, and many more make up social capitals more 
frequent expression.   
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 While the benefits of social capital may seem obvious to anyone in a tightly 
networked community, they may seem less so to those in a fragmented body-politic.  As 
we will see in the Walkerton, Canada case study (chapter 4), social capital was essential 
to the overall disaster resilience of the community (Murphy, 2007).  In addition to 
resilience, studies have revealed that the presence of social capital in the community is 
strongly correlated to the overall physical and mental health of its members (Schultz, 
Obrien, and Tadesse, 2008).  While the benefits of social capital spread throughout the 
community, it is at the neighborhood level where relations are at their most influenceable.  
Social capital is not simply the organic interactions between individuals seeking 
expression of their interests; in addition, government may bolster social capital.  It has 
been demonstrated that communities can facilitate street level social capital through the 
institutionalization of neighborhood participation in policy-processes (Kirlin, 1996).  One 
shining example of this comes from the creation of the Office of Neighborhood 
Associations in Portland, Oregon; described by Robert Putnam as having “helped sustain 
and encourage the sort of civic activism” that has made the city a bastion for civic 
engagement (Putnam, 2003).  As Putnam notes, the Portland case represents an anomaly 
in a trend of declining social capital across the nation, and there may be a clear reason for 
this situation.   
 The atrophy that we see in the levels of social capital, from the stellar heights of 
Tocqueville’s description to the disengaged levels Putnam describes, is linked to policy-
process disengagement.  In what Robert and Janet Denhardt call the “old public 
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administration,” we see all the hallmarks of a system that effectively kills social capital as 
it pertains to the establishment of networks (Denhardt, 2000).  There is no room in the 
bureaucratic model for reciprocity; trust is sabotaged by a lack of transparency; flexibility 
is hindered by limits on discretion; and communication is carefully controlled.  The 
vertical accountability and command structure undermines the horizontal integration of a 
community.  This effectively works against the understanding that communities 
exhibiting a high degree of social capital are exquisite problem solving units (National 
Research Council, 2006).  At the federal level, there are a number of ways social capital 
can be bolstered through reforms in institutional transparency, electoral campaigns, and 
the policy processes (Sagurao Seminar, 2000).  While the bureaucratic organization of 
emergency management has done little to slow the erosion of social capital, local 
managers have been left with little time or resources to reach out to established 
associations like those found in Portland neighborhoods.   
 The role that social capital plays in a community is one that should not be 
underestimated by citizens or leaders.  For emergency management there is an essential 
lesson, one that was taught in CERT training, that you as a community member will 
always be the first responder in a disaster.  This rather humbling thought should put 
impetus on efforts to engage the public, but to large degree, it has failed to do so.  Social 
capital is something that is expressed in many shapes, comes in many forms, and requires 
trust and reciprocity to maintain.  What has been on display during the last decade of 
emergency management restructuring is a fundamental disconnect between reciprocity 
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and trust brought on by centralization and bureaucratization.  The trend that has undercut 
social capital can be reversed through a renaissance of government/citizen relations at the 
neighborhood level, greater local and state input on national policy, buoyed by greater 
federal efforts at transparency, dialogue, and public participation.   
Disadvantages 
 Increases public participation may produce numerous, but not insurmountable, 
challenges to organizational and managerial norms.  This section will identify eight 
essential problems that face any endeavor to include the public in policy.  The first 
disadvantage of more inclusive participation involves the possible subordination of expert 
opinion to a degree that their advice is all but ignored.  While this may seem quite 
serious, the level of certainty maintained by experts is flanked on three sides by 
ambiguity in priorities, uncertainty on combination effects, and sheer ignorance involving 
the unknown-unknowns (Stirling, 2008; Hampton, 2009).  With this understanding, both 
public and experts should have institutionalized roles to challenge uncertainty.   
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Table 4 Dynamics of Uncertainty 
Knowledge 
About 
Likelihoods 
 Knowledge 
About 
Outcomes 
 Not Problematic Problematic 
Not 
Problematic 
Understandable Risk 
-Where there is an 
relatively high 
understanding of conditions 
Ambiguity 
-Where no clear consensus is 
available on conditions, ethics, lack 
of trust and incommensurable 
priorities produce varied advice 
Problematic Uncertainty 
-Where complexity, human 
elements, and transboundry 
effects may take effect 
Ignorance 
-Unanticipated effects, conditions, 
gaps, unknowns and general lack of 
predictability 
* Andy Stirling, “Science, Precaution, and the Politics of Technological Risk.” 2008 pp.99 
    
 A second disadvantage involves the high correlation between the top socio-
economic groups and those that participate in public affairs.  While is generally true, the 
efforts to organize the public on behalf of emergency management have been very 
minimal.  Despite lack of attention, surveys reveal that 64% of citizens stated they would 
be willing to engage activities such as the CERT training, if afforded the opportunity 
(Citizen Corps, 2009).  There is obviously a desire among a diverse citizenry to 
participate in self-help activities.  The third problem involves the challenges groups’ face 
reaching consensus with disparate and overly technical information.  One critique of 
consensus involves what is identified as the lowest-common denominator problem.  This 
surfaces when a group of individuals concludes by agreeing on a point where their 
individual interests are secured without any substantial ground being surrendered, rather 
than pursuing the most rational choice at the cost a particular view (Coglianese, 1999).  
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This problem is reasonable to assume only if a policy is created by consensus without 
some direction by authorities, a position this study is not positing.  Bargaining and 
collaboration are activities the general public participates in daily, and there is no reason 
to believe they would suddenly become unwilling.   
 The next two problems concern the poor policy produced by lack of larger policy 
objectives and efficiency of policy creation (Sunstein, 2005).  The first of these problems 
concerns public input at the early policy stages, which may produce decisions difficult or 
impossible to implement by administrators.  The answer to the problem is twofold; first 
greater time is taken early in the policy process as stakeholder views are incorporated 
with other demands.  This produces broader considerations, including understandings of 
administration, which later facilitates greater implementation efficiency.  This stands in 
contrast to a group of legislators who may rapidly enact policy, with little understanding 
of the challenges faced by distant administrators.  The second problem is the perceived 
loss of decision control and increased veto points in the policy process.  It is the position 
of this study to increase the capacity for decision quality by increasing the choices 
provided by a broadened range of considerations (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004).  
  The final three disadvantages of public participation involve a lack of public 
sensitivity to temporal, political, and fiscal considerations (Klinke, 2002).  This presumes 
the inclusion of the public, as an ignorant rabble, occurring in a leaderless vacuum, a 
proposition not made here.  Rather, input from the public is garnered and utilized by 
leaders for optimal policy output.  The public consists of disciplined, calculating, and 
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responsible individuals who are capable of benefiting policy processes given a measured 
degree of direction.    
Conclusion 
 The advantages and disadvantages of public participation in emergency 
management described here are not definitive, and indeed the dynamic nature of disasters 
requires flexibility.  What is important to understand is that the carefully fortified borders 
of information and efficiency that bureaucrats hold sacred, can with the right finesse be 
bolstered by public participation.  The disadvantages should not dissuade us from 
incorporating public participation, but rather offer us glimpses into the specific areas the 
public can be most potently utilized.  These specific areas of policy will be the focus of 
the ensuing chapters.  The inclusion of the public dialogue on policy can also help distill 
a rich civic environment, one that would pay many dividends to emergency managers 
during a disaster.   
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Table 5 Advantages and Disadvantages of Public Participation 
Public Participation: 
 Advantages and Disadvantages 
 Benefits Disadvantages 
Information  Educates Public on importance 
of issues 
 Clarifies ambiguities of 
“wicked’ problems 
 Holistic perspective 
 Greater contextual reference 
 Increased Stakeholder 
involvement  
 Expert/Professional could be 
disregarded 
 Top Socio-economic groups 
dominate  
 Lowest common denominator 
problem 
 May produce poor policy 
according to experts 
Efficiency  Breaks Decision Gridlock 
 Government may avoid 
litigation risks 
 More Efficient Implementation 
of regulation and law 
 Greater clout for resource 
allocation 
 Increase Governmental Trust 
 Less efficient early policy stages 
 Loss of Decision Control 
 Increased Veto Points 
 May politically back-fire 
 Lack time sensitivity 
 Cost/Budgetary concerns not 
effectively addressed 
 
 
Conclusion 
 Public participation is a very contentious phrase in administration, and this 
chapter has attempted to clarify where it stands in relation to public policy.  In order to do 
so it first compared what John Dewey eulogized as the former public and what he called 
the ‘new’ public.  Dewey’s later description of a largely disengaged and apathetic public 
is one we well recognize as our own.  To remedy this problematic policy situation will 
require a renaissance in public-government relations both horizontally and vertically.  
This requires us to understand what participation is, and Arnstein’s ladder revealed that 
currently the public plays a non-participatory role.  Two dominate theoretical 
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understandings of how the public engages policies were found to be incomplete for the 
purpose of this study.  Drawing from deliberative and pluralistic models, a dynamic 
model was introduced emphasizing dialogical interactions; based on equal stakeholder 
positions and facilitated by government for collaborative purposes.  Essential, 
participation needs to be introduced where advantages are most evident, and leave the 
public out of stages where they would detract from goals, remembering the inclusion of 
the public in policy processes can bolster social capital.  Finally, the public will always 
bring both advantages and disadvantages to the policy process.  Having a vibrant network 
of neighbors could mean the elimination of an exponentially increasing number of 
victims during and in the wake of a disaster.  This is the case because the public plays 
one of two roles; either as the victim or as the first responder to aid other victims.  The 
degree to which we can impact which one you will be, depends on where precisely in the 
emergency management policy process we introduce public participation.   
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Ch.4 The Public in Emergency Management 
 
Introduction 
 The absentee role of the public in today’s emergency management policy process 
and administration [Ch.2] becomes problematic as we begin to understand the 
interdependences of social life that disasters disrupt.  Adding to the problem, our 
technological sophistication has increased, as have the frequency and costs of disasters.  
In reaction to disasters, the federal government has dedicated an enormous amount of 
financing, organizational knowledge and expertise to defending the nation.  Defending is 
the correct adjective, as the methodology is based on Cold War strategies, and lacks 
balance with the community.  This creates a Federal Emergency Management Agency 
dedicated to response and recovery, but less interested in mitigation and preparedness, 
despite public interest (Rossi, 1982).  To FEMA’s credit, it has taken leaps to 
professionalize its field, and the billions of dollars it commands have enormous impact in 
recovering communities.  Sadly, pre-disaster efforts such as partnership building and 
education have been deemphasized.  The Whole Community Approach, FEMA’s most 
recent initiative, recommends a number of steps on display in this study: creating a place 
for the public at the planning table; let public participation lead; build trust through 
participation; and planning for real situations (U.S. DHS, FEMA, 2011).  Fundamentally 
missing is how local emergency mangers are going to implement, pay-for or find the time 
for these suggestions without institutional change.  Something is missing from FEMA’s 
commitment to mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery; the institutionalized role 
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for the public in the policy process and administration of programs. 
 The role of the general public in the American political system and policy 
processes has been a contentious topic well before Tocqueville’s early 19th century 
championing.  Contrary to the Tocquevillian view, the twentieth century demonstrated a 
growing trend of public apathy and distrust towards government activities.  Apathy and 
distrust have in part emerged from a policy-monopoly at the federal level.  For 
emergency managers, this apathy and distrust led to a citizenry lacking fundamental 
preparedness and community-ties to help deal with disasters.  To combat a lack of citizen 
engagement, which leaves the nation more vulnerable, this chapter will look at key areas 
within the emergency management policy process and administration where public 
participation could be introduced.  First, literature on public participation in emergency 
management will be surveyed.  Second, the policy stages of agenda-setting and policy-
formation represent opportunities for attuned policy-makers to apply the strengths of 
participatory dynamics and federal devolution.  Third, the administrative emergency 
management phases of mitigation and preparedness can be expanded to include non-
structural and more collaborative implementation methods.  Interweaved with these key 
areas will be current examples from the United Kingdom, New Zealand and India, where 
greater participatory involvement exist.  These case studies will illuminate 
recommendations for the greater public participation posited here, in areas where it could 
most befit our communities and emergency managers.  
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Literature on Public Participation in Emergency Management 
 The five studies reviewed below will explore the dynamics of emergency 
management in consideration of the efficiency of, obstacles involving, and 
implementation of public participation.  These mirror the greatest considerations 
managers have when considering the imposition of additional voices in the policy 
process.   
Efficiency  
Bach-Kaufman 
  The study by Robert Bach and David J. Kaufman probes the fundamental 
disconnect between the general public and emergency planners.  In order to create a safer 
and more secure community, their study shows public mangers (dealing with 
emergencies) how to reach the public collectively and on a large scale (Bach and 
Kaufman, 2009).  Their study concentrates on public policy actors at the federal, state, 
and local levels within the continental United States.   
 In order to suggest a new paradigm in DHS policy, the researchers focused their 
qualitative analysis on federal initiatives, DHS agency reports and official statements, as 
well as reports from local politicians and law enforcement.  The researchers studied 
levels of overall public preparedness and post-911 trends in DHS organization to arrive at 
their conclusions.  To illuminate these trends, their study analyzed two DHS directives 
involving border-security and national strategic preparedness, to find areas that have 
disenfranchised the general public from greater partnerships.  While security is essential, 
the role delegated to the public in general has been one of passive compliance rather than 
 Public Participation in Emergency Management  
 
76 
 
active participation. 
 While the foci of DHS mangers has been activity in providing policy in the name 
of security and institutional preparedness, the results of this study highlight some 
deficiencies.  First, it concluded that the dominance of federal level policy-formation and 
decision-making undermined local authorities’ ability to successfully protect 
communities.  Second, the general public was woefully unprepared for emergency 
situations because local authorities were engaged in federal agency mandates rather than 
increasing community involvement.  In the case of Hurricane Katrina, local authorities 
followed federal direction on anti-terrorism policy at the cost of natural disaster planning.  
To rectify this problem, the study suggests a number of recommendations: joint-decision 
making process, public dialog about risk, establishment of a national directive and 
institute for preparedness and community preparedness routinization-programs.  While 
these recommendations specifically address the public deficit in emergency management, 
they are not without limitations, as described in the previous chapter.  
Mitchell 
 As former FEMA director James Witt noted, “all disasters are local. “  Despite 
this, post 9/11 focus on homeland security has realigned emergency management at the 
federal level and undercut local partnership (Edwards, 2007).  James K. Mitchell’s study 
provides contrast to the trend in leadership centric policies that have emerged since 
Hurricane Katrina by reintroducing the importance of partnerships to emergency 
management (Mitchell, 2006).  New Orleans provides the setting for this study because 
of the sheer enormity of the disaster and the fact the despite federal and local authority’s 
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confidence, plans and initiative; FEMA was rapidly overwhelmed.  
 In order to flesh-out the problems that seem so numerous in the Hurricane Katrina 
disaster, Mitchell’s study focused on committee and agency documents, insurance 
industry disaster findings, as well as nongovernmental agency reports that illustrate 
numerous shortcomings.  Mitchell notes eight specific emergency management activities 
that had been recently consolidated, from more open and transparent methods to more 
centralized bureaucratic operating models.  These consolidated activities include event 
framing, hazard analysis, emergency reactions, behavior considerations, varied decision-
making, sources of information, avenues of potential management, and inter-disciplinary 
openness.  In addition, the study brings a brief comparison of United States emergency 
management with the government responses from China, New Zealand, Canada, and the 
European Union.  The primary concern of this article is to describe the differences in 
perspectives between broad-national and narrow-community partners, and the effect 
those perspectives have governmental efforts to address disasters.   
 This study concludes that current trends in emergency management have removed 
the benefits of varied partnerships and created four limitations, including; decreased 
public knowledge about threats, less flexible planning for unforeseen complications, lack 
of important contextual information on disaster, as well as a narrowing of interpretations 
of risk, which decreases overall coverage.  The reasons for consolidating these areas are 
clearly important for command and control purposes, but do not adequately address the 
‘‘wicked’’ problems faced by emergency managers.  These problems are rarely linear, 
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straightforward or without moral pitfalls.  For these complex or ‘‘wicked’’ societal 
problems, the increase in overall general knowledge about a disaster area and its people 
are an advantage under-utilized by centralized emergency management.  
Discussion 
 The efficiency focus that produced a very centralized bureaucratic organization 
was intended to maximize command and control functions.  Command and control 
functions are appropriate for many problems that government works to solve, but not all.  
As the above articles have attempted to demonstrate, emergency management could 
benefit from greater community inclusion in the policy processes.  The inclusion of 
greater general participation at the end of the policy process, while providing local 
authorities with greater autonomy, will not solve the lack of preparedness in a 
community.  The reason for this, local emergency management is likely to transpose 
federal command and control systems onto local political systems for response and 
recovery, thus excluding the general public.  Mitchell has a sense of this in his article and 
thus brings public participation farther upstream, to the point where bureaucratic agents 
are assessing hazards and dangers faced by communities.  While this is a further step in 
the direction of greater public participation in emergency management, it still does not 
address the role the public can play in agenda setting, policy formation, and 
legitimization of policy.  These early stages in the policy process have been the subject to 
controversy, as centralized leadership has focused on security at the expense of other 
considerations.   
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Conclusion  
 Mitchell’s study comes to one rather straight forward conclusion, “What is most 
needed is a way of broadening the discourse about recovery and bringing more people 
into it” (Mitchell, 2005).  While the prescription is rather clear, the implications are less 
so.  Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks the reorganization of emergency management under 
the central authority, DHS, has had detrimental outcomes for FEMA’s primary mission.  
As Bach-Kaufman illustrated the dominance of policy mandates at the federal level 
undermines local input and collaborative efforts with the community.  Mitchell added to 
this by illuminating the concerns of homeland security, and the need for highly fluid and 
efficient leadership.  Both these authors wish to increase emergency management 
knowledge by bringing in more players from the community, via closer partnerships and 
joint decision-making.  For Bach-Kaufman, local players need to be involved in guiding 
the implementation of policy at the local level.  This would more appropriately allocate 
federal resources wastefully used on terrorism prevention for areas with little chance of 
attack.  Mitchell on the other hand, wants to bring diversity to the hazards and risk 
analysis processes, typical of the mitigation phase of emergency management.  These two 
articles represent different points in the policy stream, Bach-Kaufman at the very end as 
funds drizzle down to local authorities who must follow federally created and defined 
policy on response and recovery.  On the other hand, Mitchell focuses on the enactment 
stage (middle of the policy process), and the very beginning of the bureaucratized 
emergency management mitigation phase.  Both have neglected the preparedness phase, 
which is the most professionally dominated and efficiency focused.   
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Obstacles  
Murphy  
 During a disaster, communities with a high degree of social capital can readily 
form functional partnerships and even substitute for local authorities, which in turn may 
increase overall local resilience.  The specific question that drives the Brenda L. 
Murphy’s study is whether social capital can improve community emergency 
managements’ resilience to risks and hazards (Murphy, 2007).  Community emergency 
management, described in this study, is management you would find in low population, 
homogeneous, and highly networked localities.  This definition stands in contrast to 
policy-isolated and professionalized emergency management you would find in larger 
cities or operating at the federal level.   
 To find the correlation between social capital and resilience, the study takes an 
intimate look at two separate disasters in the province of Ontario, Canada.  In the first 
case, the city of Toronto fell victim to a electrical blackout in  2003, which ultimately 
affected approximately 50 million people in the eastern regions of the US and Canada.  
The second case involves the town of Walkerton, which faced an E. coli outbreak in its 
central water supply.  The significance of these two cases stem from respondents’ 
elevated degrees of trust in their communities as well as high frequency of volunteerism 
and public participation.  While the types of disaster and affected populations of the two 
events are fundamentally different, the cases are commensurable.     
 In order to investigate the emergencies that beset both Canadian communities, 
Murphy’s study took advantage of a mixed-method survey conducted to research general 
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emergency preparedness in the wake of an incident.  While the principle intent of the 
original survey was not to investigate social capital, rather general community response, 
many questions lent themselves to this purpose.  In the electrical blackout case study, the 
researchers conducted a phone survey of 1,203 people in Toronto approximately five 
months after the outage.  In the Walkerton case, the study recorded 104 face-to-face 
structured-household-interviews, 23 interviews with local authorities/leaders and finally 2 
focus group sessions with 12 random community members approximately two years after 
the disaster.  The survey, interviews, and focus groups gathered information on three 
areas: assessments of the level of preparedness of the communities prior to blackout, 
direct impact on community members, and finally the impact of community response.   
 The results of this study reveal a number of points regarding the nature of social 
capital in relation to emergency management.  In general the study illuminated a complex 
but positive relationship between the presence of social capital and a hazard/disaster 
resilient community emergency management system.  While the natures of the two 
emergencies were very different, the emergence of citizen partnerships in both was a 
success factor shaping how the community dealt with problems.  In Toronto, media 
reports told stories of neighborhood barbeques and other such informal gatherings.  In the 
small community of Walkerton (population 5,000), three emergent citizen groups took 
the reins when local leadership failed.  These groups created and facilitated a water 
disbursement center, handled the collection and disbursement of donations, and lobbied 
for a full investigation of incident after the fact.  The differences in the community 
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response between these two areas reflect the great differences in demands placed on 
communities by particular incidents.   
Rodriguez, Havidan, Trainer, and Qurarntelli 
 Emergency management prides itself on firm planning and efficient execution 
during the response phase, but the uncertainty of disasters requires leaders to deviate 
from standard procedure, much like emergent citizen groups.  During the 2005 Hurricane 
Katrina, emergent citizen groups were reported by media to be predominantly chaotic, 
criminal and antisocial, which has since been proven patently false.  In contradiction to 
many media reports, this study shows ample evidence that most emergent activities in the 
community were not merely positive, but also took over responsibilities normally 
assumed by authorities.  The word emergent is used in this study to describe 
“nontraditional or new behavior that deviates from routine or customary norm-guided 
behavior” and is associated with large organizations, business and citizens alike 
(Rodriguez, Trainor, and Quarantelli, 2006).  The purpose of this study was to dispel the 
larger media’s portrayal of chaos, and replaced it with one illuminating the prosocial 
activities carried out by citizens, business, and organizations that deviated from 
conventional norms.  Importantly, citizens were the last line of defense, rather than 
barriers to the FEMA mission.  
 To complete this survey, the authors used data from the Disaster Research Center 
at the University of Delaware detailing events transpiring in New Orleans immediately 
after the Hurricane Katrina.  This research is composed of 150 personal interviews with 
local residents, researcher observations, official interviews, and governmental documents.  
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In addition, a single database containing various print and non-print media reports, 
organizational reports, and informal stories were utilized.  For this study the authors 
analyzed the first-hand personal accounts of residents, which were then confirmed by 
other sources.  This allowed records of personal, business, and organizational interactions 
to provide evidence contrary to popular reports of anarchy.    
 The findings of this study provide clues on the behavior of individuals and 
organizations acting in the face extreme and demanding circumstances.  Five 
organizational levels of description provide a framework for this study.  Although not 
presented in this order, they include joint field office, hospitals, hotels, search and rescue 
teams, and local neighborhoods.  Despite difference in size and capacity, all exhibited 
emergent behavior in one form or another.  The most important for the author’s study 
were those involving local neighborhoods, where they found working class people 
laboring altruistically for mutual security and survival.  Specifically, there was a group of 
friends who, after evacuating their families, stayed behind to perform rescues and support 
community members.  Much like citizens in Walkerton, these men initially worked alone 
and eventually formed a loose cooperation with authorities, to provide foodstuffs and 
other essentials to residents unable or unwilling to evacuate.  Right alongside this 
emergent citizen activity, FEMA unexpectedly established their joint field office in an 
abandoned mall.  In order to bring the mall up to the capacity required of the central hub 
of nearly all organizations involved, FEMA enlisted the help of contractors, computer 
networks, and telecommunication engineers.  The utilization of the mall was unplanned, 
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as was the rapid upgrading necessary to maintain it as the joint field office.  These two 
examples of spontaneous and emergent behavior provide us an important reminder that 
plans rarely survive first contact intact, and obstacles and advantages are often confused 
with one another.  All emergent activities reported in this study are positive, which the 
authors acknowledge might show bias. 
Discussion 
 While emergency management has focused on response and recovery capabilities, 
the building of capacity at the local level through preparedness has been overlooked 
because the general public is considered an obstacle.  According to Murphy, the level of 
social capital in a community may lead to self-help and organization, rather than what 
emergency planners usually visualize as a hapless or panicked public.  For Rodriguez, the 
citizenry can be the misunderstood champion of its own cause.  Where these articles find 
agreement is that, any plan, no matter how seemingly sound it may appear, can reach a 
fracture point.  At this point, the apparently disorganized masses that may seem to bog 
down both the policy process and emergency management phases, actually become a 
community’s last line of defense.  In the case of Walkerton, it is very clear that citizens 
organized themselves to perform many of the functions authorities would have engaged 
in.  In the case of New Orleans, the scale of destruction produced even greater divergence 
from typical community activities, including requisitioning private property of all kinds 
for the sake of the community.  These two articles demonstrate the dynamic activities of 
citizens who react positively to situations well outside their normal range of stressors.  
This adaptability would be beneficial for emergency managers to harness during the 
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policy process when bottlenecks and arbitrary decisions can have dramatic affects down 
the policy stream.   
Conclusion 
 While leadership and command structures will identify the general public as 
obstacles to agency goals, the masses represent the last line of defense against the 
breakdown of society.  Public qualities, that include diversity, independence, and 
ingenuity, may make them both difficult to work with and resilient.  The ways citizens 
respond to emergencies are as varied as the disasters they face.  Disasters represent the 
cusp at which chaos challenges order, and it should be understood that citizens for the 
most part on the side of order.  As such, they should be viewed as assets, not obstacles in 
the emergency management policy process.  An understanding of exactly how and where 
in the policy process the public best suited to help emergency management could increase 
positive outcomes. 
Implementation  
Pearce 
 The policy process and administration in emergency management can be 
constructed at the local level, using maximum stakeholder input and some federal 
structural influence.  The responsibilities of emergency mangers are made more difficult 
by the fact that both the public and community planners interests may run counter to 
emergency concerns.  This divergence in interests is not a necessary condition of 
emergency management in a community; in fact, integration of a plurality of interests can 
bring great benefits.  The purpose of Laurie Pearce’s study was to trace out the shared 
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interests of community planners, disasters managers and the public to show the benefits 
of their combined efforts in mitigation (Pearce, 2003).  The success is illustrated by the 
policies that were created in a highly seismic and landslide prone area of the Porta 
Valley, California.  The participants included average citizens, city planners, officials, 
geologists, businesses, and developers.  Where at first this group failed in creating 
successful policy, lessons were learned and sound policy emerged.  
 This study drew largely from a geologic and planning research conducted by G.G. 
Mader in 1988.  This initial research focused on how communities balance housing 
growth spearheaded by developers and the highly volatile Sand Andreas fault line.  
Pearce added to this study by illuminating the public’s role in shaping how community 
planners, experts, and developers reached an agreement by recognizing their shared 
values.  Local policy emerged from the creation of a Geologic Hazards Committee that 
included diverse expert and lay interests.  Pearce identifies the fact that a committee was 
created to involve the public, as opposed to other limited means of public integration 
(town halls, focus groups, etc.), as a successful element of this equation.   
 The findings of this study highlight the success of this community in creating 
policy sensitive to community planners, disaster management, developers and the general 
public.  Specifically, the general public engaged in discussing the problem; taking 
political action in creating expert sub-committees; legislating new regulations; ensuring 
cooperative implementation and evaluating progress.  While public and business interests 
normally resist new regulations and building codes, the openness of this committee 
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created a greater understanding of all points of view, and policy was enacted and 
implemented with abundant support.  This study provides an successful example of 
communities directly benefiting from the general public’s  inclusion in decision-making.  
Specifically this article shows that public’s integration into policy-process and decision-
making needs to be properly balanced with other interests and expert opinion and that it 
makes a difference how and where in the policy process they are included.  
Conclusion 
 Public managers of all stripes are required to find solutions to complex social 
problems, and emergency management is no different.  To do so they must be efficient 
and avoid obstacles to sound policy implementation.  In contrast to the Murphy article 
describing public response, Pearce describes public participation incorporated at nearly 
every stage of the policy process.  Where Walkerton residents effectively assumed 
responsibility for the policy process stages of enactment, implementation, and evaluation, 
citizens in Portola Valley engaged all eight stages.  Besides the four stages mentioned 
above, citizens were included in shaping the understanding of issues, discussions on 
problems, taking political action, deciding on an agenda, and passing legislation to deal 
with the problem.  As both cases demonstrate, public input can be beneficially 
implemented at the local level.  For Pearce, there was a significant initial failure by local 
authorities to properly address the seismic threat, perpetuating the problem.  This 
established a base of failure, just like the water management failure in Walkerton case, 
from which the public must work from.  Initial failure is not a necessary step, if 
implementation of the public in the policy process is done prior to a disaster.   
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Public Actors 
Introduction 
 At a general level, we can see that the role of the public in emergency 
management is discounted, but we need to delve deeper.  The public is not  a  
disorganized and quarrelsome  group who prohibit sound decisions, as some experts and 
agents posit.  Rather, it contains associations of all sizes, interests, outlooks as well as 
organizations playing a role in public comprehension, participation, and progress.  This 
section will be concerned with five groups:  local elected and unelected officials, 
academia, media, business, and community associations.  These five influential groups 
share two important characteristics useful for exploration.  First, they all have a role in 
emergency management because of the perceived strengths these actors possess.  Second, 
not all of these actors are used to the fullest of their potential by emergency management.  
This section will explore each group and help provide a more developed picture of the 
actors that make up the public described in the previous section.     
Elected and Unelected Officials 
 While federal political leaders hold enormous power over policy, political leaders 
at city, municipal, district, state, and regional levels do play an essential role in 
emergency management.  These local leaders are given the compounded responsibly of 
implementing federal policy in their communities while playing an integral part in its 
provincial activities.  This local connection, which has been interpreted by the majority of 
national authorities as a source of fault, produces problems as far as the relationship 
between electoral incumbency and community expectations in two ways.  First, it has 
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been shown that incumbent political actors will favor short-term solutions (response, 
recovery) as opposed to long-term solutions (mitigation and preparedness) because these 
activities are more likely incur political benefits during their terms of office (Olson and 
Gawronski, 2010).  A second study of local political actors shows that public emergency 
expectations are rarely acknowledged prior to a crisis, but leaders often overreact in 
response and focus on placing blame during recovery (Boin and t’Hart, 2003).  Because 
of this, the public thinks leaders have more capacity to help than they actually do, and 
leaders do not have the impetus to engage nationally shaped policy.  Local leadership, 
disengaged from federal policy formation, have failed to communicate and mobilize the 
public in an effective manner.  One method widely hailed as a solution to public 
disengagement uses “learning moments,” instances when leaders act to make an 
impression on the public about risks and self-help immediately after a disaster (World 
Bank, 2010; Malhorta and Kuo, 2008).  The problem with solutions of this kind is the 
requirement of a disaster to affect the community in a significant way, something 
emergency managers are trying to avoid.  The passive role assigned to local leaders, as 
federal policy implementers rather than entrepreneurs, is a powerful underestimation of 
local elected official’s skills and knowledge.  Local elected officials have a keen 
understanding of community dynamics, legal and illicit commerce networks, local 
custom, demographic characteristics, public and private resources, and importantly a 
sense of the trust between citizens and government.  These local factors become vital 
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during a disaster, and they should not be suppressed by the imposition of federal level 
policy.   
 Unelected officials in emergency management represent the intersection of local 
political impetus and the federally commanded initiatives.  At the local level, unelected 
officials are tasked with implementing federal policy; they come in two primary forms.  
First, they may serve at the behest of elected officials as political appointments.  These 
officials will work to intertwine policy initiatives with political policy realities.  In 
addition, appointed officials fulfill the desires of their political patrons, which can often 
put them in direct conflict with second kind of actors.  The second kind of unelected 
officials represent those that have risen through the ranks of an organization, such as a 
police or fire department.  These officials have a deep understanding of both the 
organization’s traditions and temperaments.  How a policy is administered, as well as 
how policy objectives are balanced against organizational considerations, fall heavy on 
these unelected leaders.  The contradicting views between these two different unelected 
officials may merely hamper efforts, but may also produce mutually acceptable but poor 
policy largely ineffective during a disaster.   
Social Scientists 
 The next groupings of actors contributing to the dynamic of the public are those in 
social-sciences branch of academia.  In the previous chapter, we explored the role of 
expert knowledge in the physical sciences and administrative disciplines.  Here we will 
explore the role of social scientists.  Social scientists at the federal level have been 
responsible for fundamental additions to emergency management priorities, especially to 
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our understanding of social vulnerability (National Research Council, 2006).  The 
National Science Foundation (NSF) is the premier organization dedicated to the pursuit 
of understanding disasters.  Since NSF‘s inception, the foundation has played a primary 
role in funding physical science based research in such linked organizations as the 
National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program.  Playing a relatively minor budgetary 
role, the Social and Behavioral Sciences Division of NSF has increasingly fought for 
greater resources to study the human element of disasters.  In a few ways they have 
succeed in playing an important, though discounted, role by exposing the cultural and 
social impacts of disaster, traditionally obscured by fiscal and physical terms (National 
Science Foundation, 1992; National Science Foundation, Budget, 2011).  The 
subordinated role that social scientists play is disadvantageous in two regards.  First, 
social scientists are able to apply theory and concepts to practical plans prior to 
implementation.  Importantly, problems unforeseen in previous case studies may be 
avoided by the inclusion of these elements.  Second, the nature of social science 
emphasizes collaboration and cooperation to enhance productive value (Vigoda, 2002).  
This characteristic is far more advantageous than a simple state of competition between 
dominate ideas when dealing with “wicked” problems.  Besides bearers of information, 
social scientists may also be bureaucratic outsiders that can attend to problems and 
concerns at an unofficial capacity, unhindered by bureaucratic structure and norms 
(Rourke, 1984).  At an official capacity, social scientist may also help form committees 
that shape the implementation of federal plans at the local level, as seen in the 2005 
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Portland Mitigation Plan (City of Portland, Mitigation Plan, 2005).  While the Portland 
Mitigation Plan did include the input of social scientists, it needs to be said that the 
steering committee helped facilitate a federal initiative, not local policy.  In addition, five 
hazard specific sub-committees flanked the steering committee, and those were 
dominated by physical scientists, administrative experts, and bureaucratic agents.  Rather 
than just helping to implement federal mandates, social scientists could solidify 
community concerns and facilitate communication with leaders, while helping elected 
officials and the public take advantage of the skills and knowledge they possess.  While 
social scientists may introduce substantive benefits to emergency management, another 
group of actors affects the public with the frequency and emotive content of its messages.   
Media 
 The role of media has traditionally been to inform the community about topics 
outside their ability to explore.  This role persists today, but is disfigured in four primary 
ways.  First, news media has become increasingly biased in favor of elite opinion.  This 
includes institutionalized relationships with government, demonstrated by the White 
House Press Room.  Second, media framing has increasingly ignored historical or 
contextual information in favor of sensational and emotional content.  Third, the topical 
considerations of news media have centralized to the extent that local news organizations 
directly repeat or mimic reports carried out by national news networks.  Finally, the 
national news organizations have consolidated into a handful of corporations, facilitating 
the previous three characteristics (Woodly, 2007).  These media developments influenced 
policy processes, issue framing, problem defining, and agenda setting by restricting 
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public knowledge to a narrow set of political perspectives (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004).  
The value of the old media was in its adversarial position to the establishment.  It could 
take an independent vantage point on a topic while amassing a variety of viewpoints into 
a single account.  An example of the failure to do this emerged during Hurricane Katrina 
when the media was not able to establish a detached vantage point, and rather took 
authorities opinions on security concerns and falsely reported that rioting and chaos had 
been common (Waugh, 2006).  This report came despite the fact that reporters, by their 
later admission, largely never witnessed lawlessness of any kind in decimated areas 
(Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski, 2006).  Without separation from a single perspective, 
minimal contextual reference, and a greater depth of understanding, the media cannot 
play a positive role in emergency management.  As outlined in the numerous emergency 
management plans and training materials, the media is to be provided a controlled and 
unrivaled message to prevent it from reporting information that could counter the efforts 
of authorities (EMI, IS-230a).  This controlled message undermines the media’s ability to 
allow public judgment on whether authorities are indeed maximizing their potential until 
it is too late to change their course of action.  On the other side of concentrated business, 
reflective of big media, small business represents a diverse and important segment of the 
public. 
Business 
 The relationship between business and the emergency management community is 
the most underdeveloped of all public actors.  The foremost interaction between 
emergency managers and business comes in the form of adherence to zoning, building 
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codes, work safety measures, standardized building materials, and construction 
benchmarks.  These elements have evolved over more than a century, initiated first by 
fire fighters who recommended firewalls as simple solutions to unnecessary destruction 
caused by fires that easily traverse the thin walls between buildings.  Today the Institute 
for Business and Home Safety operates under FEMA to represent corporate insurance 
concerns (Geis, 2000).  This federally directed institute helps shape information on areas 
at risk from floods, earthquakes, tornados, and hurricanes.  The role of business in DHS 
has been of growing interest, and in 2008 a report on the new “hybrid commercialization 
process” was outlined for development, production, and equipment acquisition for DHS 
(Cellucci, 2008).  The report reflects a business deal for equipment, but not the kind of 
collaboration needed to enhance a community’s resilience.  Locally, DHS has 
collaborated with private business, specifically Home Depot, to help facilitate greater 
citizen education for homeowners in New Orleans, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  Teaching average citizens proper 
installation techniques and giving advice on prudent materials was done on a very limited 
basis in a few disaster-affected areas, but not nationally.  These two examples show 
government-business partnerships in their infancy.  A truly prepared community will 
require greater effort.    
 While any efforts to connect with the business community are commendable, 
connections are still limited.  For instance, while DHS is good at dealing with large 
corporations, they have left the majority of small business out.  In fact, small businesses 
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are unlikely to have relationships with emergency managers or to have taken any 
preparedness action (Tierney, Lindell, and Perry, 2001).  This is largely due to lack of 
resources, time and highly contentious views on government intrusion.  It is also the case 
that larger businesses and corporations are more likely to have completed the FEMA 
recommended Business Continuity Plan, which helps a business avoid risk, respond to 
crisis, and recover operations more quickly (Haddow, 2010).  These facts become 
compelling when we look at the Small Business Administration’s figures showing that 
non-participating small business account for 99.7% of all employer forms.  Small 
business actors also employ around half of all private sector employees (U.S. Small 
Business Administration, 2011).  The fact that these businesses are unlikely to participate 
in simple activities such as fire and evacuation drills, or required managers to know basic 
first aid, reveals a troubled state of affairs.  One could imagine that collaboration between 
small business and emergency management would reveal local adaptions in commerce, 
transportation, as well as human capital, which could benefit a devastated community.  
Not to mention many small business owners are self-sufficient, resourceful, and prone to 
taking the initiative.  Small businesses represent pubic actors deeply connected with the 
communities and largely unconsidered by emergency managers.   
Community Associations 
 The phrase community-associations encompasses entities of various sizes, 
interests, goals and make-up, but essentially involves members of a diverse community 
coming together to cooperate on a common task.  These groups range from 
Neighborhood-Watch to book clubs and have transcended culture, economic and societal 
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difference to organize on behalf of an idea or cause.  A key association connected to 
emergency management is the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster 
(NOVAD), which has achieved federal prominence within the Citizen Corps and plays a 
small role in every phase of emergency management (NVOAD.org).  The Citizen Corps’ 
primary mission is integrating community members and government in order to facilitate 
greater local involvement in the emergency management.  According the Citizen Corps 
web site, they want to “harness the power of every individual to fulfill this mission,” and 
this researcher agrees that they succeed in the Community Emergency Response Team 
program (Citizencorps.gov).  We can better understand the overall significance of the 
Citizen Corps, and the community associations it helps organize, through its budgetary 
appropriations.  In 2011, FEMA received $10.5 billion dollars from the approximately 
$40 billion dollar DHS budget (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Budget, 2011).  
Of this $10.5 billion dollars, only an approximate $9 million dollars were directly allotted 
to the Citizen Corps.  This national agency runs on .4% of the total DHS preparedness 
grant appropriations for states (U.S. DHS, Grants, 2011).  To understand where the 
Citizen Corps stands on the list of FEMA priorities, consider that the majority of grant 
money is either directly or indirectly tied to security and response initiatives.  It must be 
noted that some, if not many, local Citizen Corps programs receive funding through a 
combination of alternative sources, thus making the total spent on such projects difficult 
to track. Although, finding alternative funding means existing personnel are redirected 
from the staffing efforts of direct public interaction.  Focus here on the federal programs 
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is intended to shed light on priority areas, and those areas that are considered less 
essential, such as Citizen Corps.  The Citizen Corps mission is to harness the citizenry, 
but resources to engage community associations have tied their hands.  Community 
associations represent a level of intimacy that creates action in the absence of authority, 
and therefore these public actors are important during a disaster.  According to surveys, 
49% of Americans believe their neighbors will be first to come to their aid during an 
emergency (Citizen Corps, 2009).  Unfortunately, due to lack of federal appropriations 
and commitment to collaborating with groups, it is likely that even if neighbors could 
come to each other’s aid they would be woefully unprepared to significantly help.  
Individual Citizens    
 The role citizens play in the positive and progressive efforts of emergency 
managers are miniscule at best.  Outside of the five groups described above, the average 
citizen plays a passive role, not directly engaged in emergency management activities.  In 
a number of ways the average person represents the most difficult entity to approach, and 
because of this, information campaigns have been used to created interest and build a 
more knowledgeable community.  These efforts have been a secondary consideration, 
and thus not very fruitful in producing a well prepared citizenry.  Programs, such as Map 
Your Neighborhood developed by Dr. LuAnn Johnson, have succeeded in creating 
neighborhood groups consisting of 15-20 households cooperating in preparedness 
(Explore Carbondale, 2012).  While this program has been incorporated in a number of 
emergency management offices across the U.S., it has yet to gain the large fiscal support 
that efforts of response and recovery enjoy.   
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Conclusion 
 The public possesses untapped and valuable qualities, largely removed from the 
emergency management policy process.  At the local level, elected officials must balance 
mandates from the federal government with reactions from a disconnected polity.  This 
has led to misallocated effort and discounted understanding of local conditions provided 
by political actors.  While the physical sciences have been fully embraced by emergency 
management, the role of social scientists has been minimal.  Rather than helping facilitate 
greater understanding between government, experts and communities; social scientists 
are relegated to aiding implementation of policy formed at the federal level.  Media 
sources, once slandered as ‘muckrakers’ for their probing of authoritative power, have 
acquired elite prerogatives.  At the federal level, collaboration between public and private 
business interests seems to be on the rise, but a small-business community ignored by 
emergency management slows progress.  Finally, community associations are the 
collaborative partners of the grossly underfunded Citizen Corps.  None of these public 
actors have been fully utilized by the federal government in the task of emergency 
management.   
The Public in Policy Processes 
 The introduction of greater public participation in government can bring with it 
both the benefits and detriments, shown in the previous chapter.  Where and when the 
public is involved takes careful consideration.  For the purposes of this section, the eight 
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stage policy process will be divided roughly in half between legislative stages and the 
administrative stages (See Figure # 2).  The first policy stages, which include issue 
emergence, problem definition, agenda setting, and policy formation will be divided 
again between areas where the general public are and where they are not included.  The 
issue emergence, and problem definition stages are already influenced by the public, as 
increasing levels of recovery funding have shown.  A knowledgeable public, aware of 
policy processes and emergency management, which is an ancillary benefit of greater 
participation, could further aid these two areas.  This study posits that agenda-setting and 
policy-formation stages develop as areas directly benefiting from greater public 
participation, while imposing the least burden on temporal and organizational concerns.  
These two stages can both benefit from the greater information base and guidance the 
public can provide, while not unnecessarily interfering with intricacies of policy activities 
or how institutions are framed.  In both policy stages, greater participation would help 
return the engaged and attentive public that John Dewey romanticized.  This section will 
explore two policy stages and identify the optimal participation level.  Then, it will define 
a practical methodology that illuminates the benefits of greater public participation.   
   Emergency management reveals a public no longer permitted to fulfill the four 
mandatory characteristics (acknowledgement of affliction, association forming, leader 
selection,  representation in state) described by John Dewey.  This is not to say that the 
public is completely obscured from the picture, but its organized inquiry is.  Because of 
what Dewey called an insufficient translation of expert to general knowledge, the public 
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reaction surfaces where government and local community disaster interactions are most 
obvious, during post-disaster recovery (Dewey, 1954).  What this means for emergency 
management, where participation is narrowly concentrated, is that recovery becomes the 
focal point of public attention.  Emergency managers taking steps in mitigation, 
preparedness, and response have not communicated their activities to the public to the 
extent value has been established.  The public, little aware of emergency management 
activities, toil in disaster areas and their plight is picked up and disseminated by media 
who to fail to acknowledge greater context.  In this case, the public coalesces around 
recovery, answered by responsive political leaders with exorbitant resource allotments 
(Henstra, 2010).  The distance between the public and its managers, for the purpose of 
rational leadership and efficiency, does so at the expense of greater exposure of the 
public to disaster threats.  The public, with only limited knowledge of emergency 
management efforts produces political focus at the phase with lowest overall return per-
dollar-spent, at the detriment of mitigation and preparedness activities.   
 This picture of the public constructed at the federal policy process level, and 
expressed though FEMA under homeland security is not the only option.  As chapter two 
described, the relationship between FEMA and the public were not always so distant.  
During the James Lee Witt years (1993-2001) FEMA’s partnerships with the public 
represented nothing short of a “path-breaking institutional innovation that (brought) a 
wide range of stakeholders into a policy-making apparatus” (Mitchell, 2006).  To those 
looking at FEMA today, the idea of broad stakeholder participation seems far more 
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distant than this short temporal reference illuminates.   
 
Policy Process: Agenda Setting    
Introduction 
 Currently, agenda-setting is largely defined by professionals in the emergency 
management community, federal level political actors, and experts in the physical science 
disciplines who together form a policy monopoly (Birkland, 1997).  Agenda setting is the 
third stage of the policy process, following issue emergence and problem definition.  
With the nature of the problem ascertained, agenda- setting attempts to identify the unit 
of measure by which any action will be judged a success or failure.  The shaping of 
criteria is a task that benefits from increases in participation, as potential concerns and 
interests can be taken into account prior to a policy implementation.  With a basic 
understanding of the unit-of-measure used to weigh criteria, the next step is to generate 
practical options and theoretical alternatives to initial ideas (Walters, Aydelotte, and 
Miller, 2000).  Here again, the increased levels of participation allow for a greater 
number of possible options to be weighed against one another.  Since emergency 
management policy has the potential to touch every stakeholder in a community, and 
indeed future stakeholders, the inclusion of wide concerns is warranted.  The inclusion of 
the public offers managers the benefits of discovering new avenues of action, helps 
educate the general public on policy processes, and finally will help increase overall 
legitimation and ease implementation (Walters, Aydelotte, and Miller, 2000).  A 
corollary benefit to the inclusion of the general public in the agenda-setting stage is the 
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diffusion of mass medias' problematic role in directing agendas.  The following section 
will examine the emergency management policy monopoly and explore devolution of 
federal authority. 
Policy Monopoly 
 The current policy system amplifies, rather than curtailing, the problems that the 
public has in effectively engaging agenda setting.  This is the case because the public 
often has little technical understanding of exactly what the problem is, and therefore 
offers a poor definition of it.  After a problem has been defined, largely on a technocratic 
and political level, the actually stage of agenda setting is engaged to solve the issue.  In 
this stage the issue is broken down by the three basic interests involved: systemic 
interests, policy entrepreneurs, and the mandatory requirements (Anderson, 2010).  First, 
the agenda from the systemic interests are those defined by professionals and experts in 
whatever issue field the problem has surfaced in, whether it is medicine, meteorology, or 
engineering.  Typically, their recommendations follow accepted frameworks of 
knowledge and encourage an expansion of previous implementation strategies.  They 
rarely, if ever, advise a radical departure from the status quo.  Second, the 
entrepreneurial interests in a policy monopoly, like in emergency management, typically 
come in the form of congressionally elected officials, their advisors, and lobbyists.  These 
actors typically advocate for distributive policies bringing greater resources or attention 
to their constituents, with less concern for potential policy success.  Finally, the 
mandatory requirements are those elements, which must be created to deal with the 
conspicuous issues emerging from problem definition.  In the case of emergency 
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management, these mandatory elements have been defined by the political impetus 
produced by sensational media coverage and command and control reactionary functions, 
producing a distinct emphasis on response and recovery.  In order to maximize 
organizational continuity and the appearance of political responsiveness, the public has 
been excluded with the reasoning that it acts too irrationally, does not understand costs, 
and lacks long-term impetus (Anderson, 2010).  Claims of this kind are true to a degree, 
but they are not the main problem.  Rather these conditions are symptoms extenuated by 
the monopolization of policy, notarized in defense of a closed agenda-setting process by 
those within the monopoly.  A closed system is intended to subvert four common traits 
found at the local county level for administrative, not policy, reasons.  First, counties 
represent greater diversity (urban, suburban, and rural) in interest than do cities.  Second, 
citizens can have greater identification and allegiance with their country as opposed other 
levels of government because of the diversity.  Third, the ambiguous nature of 
administrative duties mean cooperation is necessary for the success accomplishment 
goals.  Finally, local-to-local cooperation is easily initiated at the county level, compared 
with higher levels of government (Waugh, 1994).  These four characteristics of local 
policy implementation are considered challenges to federal policy, but represent strengths 
during a disaster.  
Devolution 
  The inclusion of the public in agenda setting will help balance the concerns of 
politicians and bureaucrats while expanding the range of concerns policy tackles.  When 
placed on the ladder of citizen participation constructed by Sherry Arnstein, emergency 
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management engages the public somewhere between tokenism and non-participation 
(Arnstein, 1969).  Two programs have defined efforts to engage the public at the federal 
level.  These are the Citizens Corps and the Emergency Management Institute, 
respectively.  While the Citizen Corp has organized the Community Emergency 
Response Team training, a well-executed program, overall the Corps suffers from 
underfunding and lack of political attention.  On the other hand, EMI has provided the 
public with a great deal of information free of charge via the internet.  While EMI can 
inform a public, it cannot engage it in dialogue or discussion.  With the current state of 
agenda-setting and public engagement clarified, it is the recommendation of this study 
that participation increase to the level of partnership between the general public and 
emergency management at the federal level.  This can be accomplished by an increase in 
local leadership’s involvement in national agenda-setting (from its current consultation) 
to participation levels for national policy.  Partnership in the agenda-setting processes 
means, “power is in fact redistributed through negotiation between citizens and power 
holders” to clarify the parameters and goals of policy (Arnstein, 1969).  At the federal 
level, this would require devolution of control expressed through grant requirements.  
Rather than very specific requirements, the government would establish a general policy 
direction and let the local officials confer on the specifics.  The political environment in 
counties across the nation can provide enhanced administrative avenues in the way of 
deepened coordination mechanism, real time specific knowledge, and leaders that are 
already operating on a cooperative level with counterparts (Waugh, 1994).  With local 
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leadership involved at the federal level, they would develop an understanding of 
participatory benefits, and engage their own communities more than at present.   
In Practice 
 The United Kingdom has taken steps to establish a national framework that is 
both resilient and capable of rapid and uniformed responses.  The very progressive Civil 
Contingencies Act of 2004 replaced former civil defense policy, which, like our own 
Cold War policy, was active in one form or another since the Second World War.  The 
new policy established a uniformed national response framework, much like the ICS and 
NIMS (see Ch.2) in the United States, but incorporates far greater local input.  Creating 
resilience at the local level is a larger goal of the UK policy, and they have taken steps to 
better understand the social, economic, and political problems that hamper resilience 
(United Kingdom Cabinet Office, 2009).  The problems facing efforts to create resilient 
communities nationwide are the same faced by local leaders and first responders on a 
daily basis, namely local distinctions in development, education, and trust.  With those 
issues in mind, the national Cabinet Office established a public consultation program so 
local authorities and professionals could shape the agenda of resilience efforts in their 
neighborhoods.  These consultations, according to Cabinet Office survey, were identified 
by local leadership as both useful and worthwhile (United Kingdom Cabinet Office, 
Consult, 2011).  Part of the satisfaction local leaders expressed comes from the literal and 
transparent revisions to policy and plans enacted based on their input.   
 The inclusion of input from local leadership in national policy has demonstrable 
benefits, but the United Kingdom’s general public has also been engaged in agenda-
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setting.  The new emphasis in resilience, aided by technology, has led to the creation of 
open-source software to provide the citizenry with current information and avenues of 
input.  These avenues are represented by government maintained and monitored websites 
that are essentially interactive and informative maps of a given township, municipality or 
incorporated area.  Online, citizens can provide their perspective, add depth to facts, and 
help shape new community proposals; transcending the limitations imposed by meetings 
or town halls (Kingston, 2007).  The recent steps taken by in United Kingdom to bolster 
resilience have had two dynamic effects.  First, concerns from local leadership, their best-
practices, and distilled knowledge have been incorporated into national policy.  Second, 
with policy now derived at least partially by local culture, the citizenry has been given 
access to information and agenda-setting processes in a more accessible manner.  The 
benefits of these inclusionary steps will be the focus of studies for years to come, for now 
they provide this study's participatory initiatives with a positive direction. 
Recommendation 
 How participation is enacted will have a large effect on how successful the policy 
is.  Since the goal of greater participation in the agenda-setting stage is to flesh out a 
higher number of ideas on a topic, we need a more involved method of interaction.  
While paper and phone surveys can help leaders better understand the mood or general 
knowledge of the public, they are too shallow for our purposes, as are community forums 
where leaders shed-light on the bureaucratic and political activities while allowing public 
comments.  What is needed is a dialogue, or a stream of meaning that flows through 
participating groups, to create new understanding based on shared concerns (Roberts, 
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2002).  To fully appreciate the complexity of “wicked” problems, three elements must be 
addressed.  First, all participants need to understand and take part in shaping specific 
goals.  Second, all involved must have some shared base of information from which to 
build ideas.  Third, there must be a real and perceived equal opportunity to influence 
outcome (Fischer, 1993).  
 The nature of the agenda-setting stage can be understood as a transition from a 
very wide range of considerations, narrowed through dialogue, to a more operational 
understanding.  Leadership would establish broad rules, objectives and structure, then as 
a group, more specific guidelines would be decided upon.  Contrary to more technical 
methods, these dialogues could be organized through workshops or planning exercises in 
the community.  A clear example of this took place in late 2009 during the initial phase of 
the Portland Plan in Portland, Oregon.  Planning administrators asked community 
members for very general thoughts on future policy directions, these thoughts were 
aggregated and distilled in later phases to create a 25-year plan (City of Portland, Phase 
1, 2010).  These explorative workshops may take a very informal structure and procedure, 
yet produce understanding between participants.  The goals of proposed emergency 
management workshops would be threefold.  The first goal, to create an emergency 
management understanding constructed by the local community.  Second, workshops 
facilitate the expansion of leader knowledge, aiding them in shaping specific policy.  
Finally, these workshops can bolster the social capital of a community and instill social 
responsibility.  Far up the policy stream agenda setting can create foundational bases 
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from which policy takes form leading to more apt institutions and implementation 
downstream.  
Policy Process: Policy Formation 
Introduction 
 With the agenda decided and the criteria defined, the policy itself begins to take 
shape.  The policy-formation stage occurs when selected alternatives are weighted against 
one another and concerns expressed.  Four general concerns must be addressed for a 
policy to be sustainable.  First, the policy must be judged on how technically sound it is.  
Second, the policy must be judged in relation to resource and budgetary considerations.  
Third, the policy must be politically feasible.  Finally, the policy must be judged by its 
acceptability to the public during implementation (Anderson, 2010).  Opposed to the 
agenda-setting stage, the policy- formation stage must take the general agenda and apply 
it to the institutional and political currents that will carry it through the remaining policy 
and implementation processes.  While this stage does require greater role for leadership, 
agents, and experts; their respective concerns need to be balanced against the goals set by 
the agenda.  Minus the public, policy reflects political conveniences and norms of 
standard operations, as opposed to organizational adaptions maximizing external impact.   
Balance 
 Within the policy formation stage, there are numerous roles for the general public 
in making superior policy by balancing interests and knowledge.  Leaders, experts and 
the public as a whole benefit in five ways from public incorporation into policy formation 
(Walters, Aydelotte, and Miller, 2000).  As in the previous stage, the public benefits by 
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learning more about shaping policy.  The public should be aware of the constraints placed 
on those shaping and administering policy prior to, not after, its implementation.  Second, 
the public can provide diverse perspectives essential in discovering nuanced differences 
in policy.  Seemingly, small initial conditions of a policy may create greater longer-term 
problems.  The third benefit emerges from the legitimizing role the public adds to policy 
it helps create, as was seen in the earthquake mitigation in Portola Valley, California 
(Pearce, 2003).  Fourth, the general public can mediate the measures of success between 
bureaucracies and political actors, who often diverge from one another.  This is facilitated 
by the greater depth of concern they provide, as opposed concentrations on 
responsiveness, rapid decision making and efficiency.  The final benefit of two-way 
communication is the reduction of misunderstand and the building of trust between the 
public and leadership, which pays dividends during a disaster.   
  The focus during policy-formation requires a multitude of considerations 
including long and short-term goals, as well as organizational and temporal constraints, 
which are complemented locally by frontline professionals and communities defining 
details in a way that best maximizes local needs and strengths (Bach, Doran, Gibb, 
Kaufman, and Settle, 2010).  To date, these considerations have been balanced between a 
relatively small group of interests in the upper echelons of government, creating a 
dysfunctionally linear institution.  Public participation can bring balance to disaster 
understanding, and help create a safer community.   
 
 
 Public Participation in Emergency Management  
 
110 
 
Interdependence 
 Policy-formation requires increased focus, which reveals greater detail about our 
interdependences.  The requirements that help define the quality of the policy (technically 
sound, politically feasible, and publicly acceptable) mean the dialogue between interests 
must be duly calibrated.  For this reason, communications need to take a more 
deliberative format than in agenda-setting, to decide upon a course of action that will 
most completely address the problem (Fischer, 1993).  The same rules of engagement 
apply from previous dialogues, but topics will address specific policies under specific 
circumstances.  This form of dialogue was visible during a tabletop exercise conducted 
by the Portland Bureau of Emergency Management’s Local Energy Assurance Plan 
(LEAP), which took place November 9
th
, 2011 (City of Portland, LEAP, 2011).  The 
exercise happened in a large room, with about a hundred persons representing 
government (TriMet, ODOT, etc.), finance (Banks, Corporations, etc.), and community 
institutions (universities, clinics, etc.).  Key to its success was devising a disaster 
scenario, in our case we imagined being on day three after an 8.0 on the Richter scale 
earthquake struck Portland.  The groups were broken into their respective interests and 
guided by emergency managers through a series of questions meant to draw out deeper 
considerations on potential problems.  The results were surprising.  Responses ranged 
from near total unawareness of emergency management goals to understanding that 
agencies had shared concerns and overlapping responsibilities.  The most powerful and 
moving lesson was how all those involved underestimated the level of interdependence in 
our community.  The format and structure of this exercise is a staple of FEMA’s training 
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program for professionals, and there is no reason that under the right guidance, it could 
not incorporate a greater range of public actors.   
In Practice 
 Public participation in emergency management policy formation in New Zealand 
has taken an even more inclusionary path.  Starting in 1996, the New Zealand 
government decided to engage the community in an effort to establish a more robust 
emergency management policy.  To glean ideas, the government held workshops with 
local leaders, first responders, volunteer organizations, professional groups, and 
community associations.  From these workshops, it was decided that a new policy needed 
to be established shaping emergency management so that it could assist communities in 
achieving their respective goals (Britton, 2000; Britton, 2002).  The Civil Defense 
Emergency Management Act of 2002 enumerated many different policy approaches, but 
importantly it required and detailed greater public participatory efforts.  Specifically, a 
local emergency management group would be engaged in the national policy formation 
process.  In addition, the local group must provide the general public with notice of any 
plans that they are currently working on.  The level of inclusion does not end there, but 
any interested parties can submit a comment and be “given a reasonable opportunity to be 
heard by the body” (New Zealand, 2002).  While long-term studies have yet to be 
completed on the effect of public incorporation in New Zealand, the earthquake that 
shook Christchurch in February of 2011 will no doubt be the focus of future academics, 
leaders, and emergency managers.   
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Recommendations 
 The role of the general public in emergency management policy-formation has 
changed very little in the last 50 years.  Starting in California, the Civil Defense programs 
in the 1950’s completed neighborhood surveys that captured basic information on 
occupants, contact information and water and natural gas  shut off locations (Simpson, 
2001).  Today the general public plays a similar passive role, albeit greatly more 
sophisticated, through Geographic Information Systems.  With the varied information 
collected, complex models are created to help emergency managers predict physical, 
economic, and social impact of disasters.  While the data can provide useable information 
on planning, it cannot directly interact with the population to build capacity.  In addition, 
the system is expensive and requires a high degree of technical sophistication to operate 
and maintain (Brown, 1996).  In order to form policy with multilateral impacts, such as 
increasing individual preparedness and community reliance through knowledge, the 
general public needs to be directly and institutionally involved.  If emergency mangers 
simply glean information from communities, there is always the tendency to disregard 
information which is most administratively incompatible, undercutting efforts like 
FEMA’s Whole Community Approach (U.S. DHS, FEMA, 2011).  It is this study's 
recommendation that the public, citizens at the local level and local leaders at the federal 
level, participate at the partnership rung of Arnstein’s ladder in formative community 
consultations (Arnstein, 1969).  Much like the previous policy step, agenda- setting, 
members of the community would provide formative input on more narrowly defined 
courses of action.  Specific steps would be prioritize by assemblies and responsibilities 
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assigned to groups according to ability.  Subsequently, leaders end up with a policy 
agreed on by public with the understanding that political and administrative demands will 
be later accounted for.  Proceeding policy stages of legitimization and enactment are best 
left to political actors to engage, just as bureaucrats should direct implementation.   
Conclusion Policy Focus 
 To conclude, this policy focused section will build on some general ideas already 
presented.  The incorporation of a greater participatory role of citizens in local emergency 
management, and local leadership in federal agenda-setting and policy-formation can 
provide a number of benefits.  Currently our policy processes do not take advantage of 
the network-power our society has (Booher and Innes, 2002).  One step forward would be 
to engage society in reflecting on its own capabilities, a level of awareness usually 
established by severe and frequent disaster impacts (Tierney, Liddell, and Perry, 2001).  
Frankly, public awareness derived from repeated failure is far too costly.  Participation 
does come with costs for policy makers, including increased time requirements and 
negotiated results.  These detriments have been controlled for by the focus on agenda-
setting and policy- formation stages.  These two stages necessitate a transition from broad 
understanding to narrower policy goals, a function public knowledge can aid.  This leaves 
legitimation and enactment policy stages for political and bureaucratic actors who can 
most effectively legislate and implement policy.  The time lost by incorporating the 
public in early policy stages, is made up in a more effective and efficient implementation.  
An increase in public participation in policy formation creates ancillary benefits that 
emerged downstream in the policy process. 
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Emergency Management: Resilience from Mitigation and Preparedness 
Introduction 
 Emergency management builds on the four phases and principles that make up the 
continuum of understanding disasters.  The current organizational and fiscal 
concentrations have been problematically focused on response and recovery phases.  
These phases are first-responder centric and politically most conducive to answering 
public outcry after a disaster has struck.  Unfortunately these efforts are not cost-
effective, as illustrated by a the National Mitigation Council finding that for every one 
dollar spent on mitigation, four would be saved over response and recovery activities 
(Multi-Hazard Council, 2005).  This becomes increasingly problematic as climate change 
promises higher-impact events arriving with more frequency, producing more threats to 
our technologically advanced society.  An emerging paradigm in the international 
emergency management community, put forth in part by the United Nation’s 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction campaign, is of community resilience.  The 
core of this new paradigm emphasizes community and greater concentration on 
mitigation and preparedness efforts.  This section will explore how greater public 
participation relates to resilience, and how participation can be applied within the existing 
phases of mitigation and preparedness.    
Resilience 
 Community resilience is still evolving as a concept, but it has widened 
understanding about dynamics between a society and disasters.  The definition of 
resilience is not static, so the definition presented here will be a collage of ideas.  First, 
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resilience describes a community’s ability to have an adaptive capacity to sustain when 
faced with a disruptive challenge (United Kingdom Cabinet Office, 2009).  
Sustainability, adaptability, and capacity are all terms connected to resilience, needing 
further exploration.  Sustainability during a disaster refers the ability of a community to 
maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure.  In order for it to sustain social 
structures and function, society must be built from flexible foundations.  These 
foundations allow for pragmatic and fluid course corrections, in other words adaptability 
(O’Brien, 2006).  Essential to the idea of resilience is the understanding that a community 
has a certain capacity to resist direct and indirect disasters effects.  By bolstering 
awareness, anticipating problems and increasing self-organization, capacity is increased 
(United Nations, 2007).  The final, and most crucial element of resilience, is an 
understanding of the general public’s role.  In every definition of resilience, this study 
noted there is a reference to greater public participation in emergency management 
efforts.  Resilience authorities agree leaders need to embrace far greater collaboration 
with the public to increase capacity and awareness.  In addition, resilience requires the 
incorporation of a greater number of mitigation techniques into the everyday lives of 
citizens (Geis, 2000).  This of course means altering the daily habits of a community, 
requiring nothing short of changing the cultural attitudes in society, a daunting prospect 
(McEntire, 2002).  Finally, resilience requires everyone in the community to take more 
responsibility for themselves and the bonds of interdependence (United Kingdom, 
Cabinet Office, 2009).  A resilient community has mitigated all possible threats, has 
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prepared down to the individual citizen, possesses flexible and proactive leadership, and 
enhanced public participation.  Resilient communities are the exception in in the United 
States, but we can bolster the efforts of mitigation and preparedness with increases of 
participation, steering us in the right direction.   
 
Emergency Management: Mitigation 
Introduction 
 Mitigation refers to the actions taken by a community to prevent or severely 
decrease the initial impact from a disaster; such as building codes, land use regulations, 
and dike construction.  By far the greatest mitigation effort concentrates on structural 
activities, because they represent long-term physical solutions.  Non-structural mitigation 
represents a much smaller effort nationally, but can offer substantial returns.  Non-
structural efforts include educating the public, addressing social vulnerabilities, and 
building partnerships across a community.  In order to bolster the effectiveness of non-
structural mitigation, there should be a concerted effort by the government to bring the 
general public into the fold.  Two promising areas in public participation that can 
positively impact mitigation include building awareness through education and 
community planning through partnerships.  The following section will explore mitigation 
in reference to education and partnerships.  
 The current state of citizen engagement in emergency management has been 
described as primarily informative in previous chapters.  Providing basic information in 
children’s primary education and subsequent informational provisions from emergency 
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management has not adequately bolstered public awareness.  Reasons for general public 
ignorance range from lack of consistent and routinized messages to confusion over which 
authorities are tasked with what responsibilities.  Resilience demands that the public is 
not just informed about emergency management, but are engaged in dialogue.  In order to 
create a truly disaster resilient community three factors need to be addressed 
educationally; culture, vulnerability and responsibility (McEntire, 2002).  First, we need 
to change the way our culture thinks about disasters.  Today, perspectives on disasters 
have been conditioned by the National Flood Insurance Program.  On a national level, 
those in need of assistance after a disaster will always be a minority and this minimalizes 
understanding of impact, and breeds a culture that denies the likelihood of disasters 
(Moss, 2002).  Second, societal vulnerability needs to be understood as those of low 
political representation; minorities, elderly, and the socioeconomically disadvantaged are 
most at risk (Bolin and Stanford, 1998).  Without awareness of the vulnerable, a greater 
loss in human life and resources is certain.  Finally, people must be educated about the 
reality of just how much the government will be able to assist them.  Personal 
responsibility is in deficit, as numerous government reports noted the majority of people 
had dreadfully over-optimistic appraisals of government disaster response capabilities.  
This section will explore how elements of culture, vulnerability, and personal responsibly 
can be engaged by emergency managers to produce resiliency through mitigation. 
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Education 
 Passive and strictly informational public education methods are not adequate to 
create resilient communities.  What is required is a comprehensive approach engaging 
citizens in their homes, schools, at work, in their community associations and in 
interactions with government.  Currently, citizens are engaged in mitigation activities 
though a multitude of disjointed agencies.  These range from city planners, non-
governmental organizations and the fire department, but there should be a way of 
engaging the public on a unified front by getting them to participate in issue discussion.  
One important element leadership and federal policy has misplaced is the idea that our 
reality, including our hazards and risks, are a social construct (National Research 
Council, 2006).  This is of practical, not just philosophical, concern, as issue salience 
must be grounded in local custom and understanding.  Risk analysis shaping mitigation 
efforts have often been deterministic, based on technological and expert knowledge, 
which has reduced the social dynamics of risk into issues of likelihood and magnitude 
(Stirling, 2008).  While generalizable understanding of risk can be communicated by 
experts and diffused over the internet, for concerns to blossom into resilience in the 
community they must be incorporated at the local level.  Rather than a binary 
understanding of risk, the public can infuse mitigation understanding with a “thick” 
description of significance (Horlick and Jones, 2009).  This description does not ignore 
important elements of a community, such as preferred ways of life, trust relations, 
emotional commitments, and local history.  In order to facilitate this understanding, 
everyone in the community must be accounted for.  While the United Nations ISDR 
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program recommends engaging children in primary education systems with emergency 
management lessons, this can only be part of the method of building attitudes, exposing 
vulnerabilities and instilling personal responsibly (United Nations, 2007).  The 
incorporation of the general public participation into discussion on mitigation strategies 
and hazard analysis, according to Arnstein’s ladder, should be at the partnership level.  
For mitigation this means including the public as contributing members of the defining 
and implementation of mitigation strategies, a goal that adds depth to emergency 
management efforts.   
Partnerships 
 The second area that requires greater public participation to create resiliency 
involves the creation of greater partnerships.  Partnerships between levels of government, 
business, experts and the general public all need to be more closely networked to advance 
mitigation.  Partnerships require two different interests to share information, resources, 
and trust.  Despite calls to “build and maintain partnerships,” a lack of transparency, 
flexibility, and local control hamper results (U.S. DHS, FEMA, 2011).  In order to 
capture the value of unique community strengths, non-structural mitigation plans need to 
be based on a high degree of local concerns.  In addition, efforts should be co-supported 
by grassroots efforts, as opposed to federal mandates (Geis, 2000).  Local efforts to 
address vulnerable populations and attempts to empower the socially marginalized are 
most effective.  Along with greater government partnerships, we need to bring the private 
sector further into the mitigation conversation.  Business can support mitigation in three 
fundamental of ways.  First, they can support FEMA by educating their employees on 
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work practices that can mitigate disaster effects, such as job site threats.  The 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration already incorporate elements of this for 
personal safety, such as the proper storage of explosive and flammable chemicals.  
Second, business can better understand how their operations may contribute to the 
severity of a disaster.  Chemical processes prominent in high-technology manufactures 
like Intel Corporation pose a serious threat to the community if not planned (to an extent 
this is already a requirement of businesses storing potentially dangerous materials).  
Finally, business can create continuity plans to decrease impact of interruptions in 
services, aiding recovery in a disaster area.   
 Another important partnership is between expert and local knowledge holders.  
These collaborations can fill gaps in quantifiable or qualitative information, clarify 
uncertainty, and help resolve the challenge posed by unpredictably (Pearce, 2005).  
Resilience requires that members of the community understand the significance of roles 
other members play in a disaster.  Resilience, through partnerships, also means 
understanding how each partner can work to mitigate disaster effects.  These steps, 
according to Robert Putnam, taken by emergency managers to facilitate partnerships and 
communication are also ways in which a community increases its social capital, directly 
correlated to resiliency (Putnam, 2003).  
In Practice 
 Emergency managers in India have attempted to take a holistic understanding of 
society, and apply non-structural mitigation efforts to increase resiliency.  Two 
components help shape Indian emergency management; first, broad efforts were 
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identified which produce long-term impacts to maximize the return on current activities.  
Second, poverty alleviation is a necessary engagement when leaders hope to increase 
community capacity (Joseph and Chakrabarti, 2011).  To achieve a resilient community, 
those that are most vulnerable must be incorporated to a degree that matches their 
vulnerability.  This means that those that are most vulnerable must participate in how the 
community determines risk.  One study was conducted in India to determine the value of 
risk assessment methods ranging from technically sophisticated to simple and relatively 
accessible.  Findings show that sophisticated methods provided more accurate data, but at 
far greater cost and with no guarantee that communities would act on the information.  
On the other hand, the more accessible methods of risk assessment had a greater overall 
impact on communities.  Communities that engaged the citizens in risk assessment were 
more likely to see those citizens engaging in implementation of mitigation activities 
(Guragain, 2008).  The two-way communication process between leaders and citizens 
created impetus in the community to self-help by building a shared knowledge about risk 
and policy processes.  The study recommends a blend of technical and simple citizen 
based risk analysis to maximize both accuracy and implementation.  India’s efforts to 
increase community resilience have benefited from the inclusion of the public, both from 
the standpoint of leaders addressing vulnerability and citizens understanding emergency 
management objectives.   
Recommendation  
  Mitigation is a core element of resiliency, thus far overwhelmingly advanced in 
structural forms by federal policy.  A greater emphasis on the non-structural efforts that 
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work to transform the entire community will be necessary to facilitate transformation, 
which can be achieved through policies extending emergency management training into 
primary education.  While this will no doubt impact the next generation of community 
members, we don’t have to wait that long.  In order to change attitudes, acknowledge 
vulnerabilities and increase personal responsibilities the public needs to be engaged.  One 
way to do this is provide community members with a place among leaders, emergency 
managers, and experts at the mitigation table.  As partners in collaboration, the general 
public can expand the base of knowledge, help shape primary concerns, fill gaps in 
knowledge, resolve uncertainty and most important they can increase their own 
awareness.  The ancillary benefits of participation are increased civic knowledge, 
personal responsibility, and social capital as well as the creation of new resiliency norms.  
Collaborative mitigation cannot be carried out unless emergency management reaches out 
to all members of the community, including average citizens, small businesses, social 
scientists, and members of marginalized groups.  By building avenues of communication 
between these groups, new strategies and tactics can emerge.  A public mitigation session 
would facilitate greater risk awareness, help shape partnerships, and create norms of 
resilience.  Emergency managers benefit from knowing that mitigation will be more 
politically feasible, public acceptable and implementable with more concerns addressed 
during formation.  The role of the public in mitigation is important, but it can be extended 
into the first-responder and expert dominated phase of preparedness.   
 
 
 Public Participation in Emergency Management  
 
123 
 
Emergency Management: Preparedness 
Introduction 
 The preparedness phase of emergency management is an area almost completely 
dominated by leadership, emergency managers, and first-responders.  At the core of 
preparedness is the idea that authorities need to maintain a state of disaster response 
readiness.  In order to do so, plans have been created framing hierarchy, communication, 
responsibilities, and the breakdown of complex activities into steps.  Training and 
exercising in emergency management techniques are continually carried out to refine the 
skills of both leadership and first-responders.  Plans, training and exercises are essential 
in a cycle of preparedness, infusing new understandings evolved from evaluative 
practices (Bowen, 2008).  The strength of this focus on leadership and first-responders is 
the creation of a systemized top-down approach to rapid and uniform disaster response.  
The great challenge FEMA notes is educating the public on preparedness, and their 
solutions have come most from in creative marketing schemes.  The 2009 Citizen Corps 
Survey found that only 44% of American households have created an emergency plan 
(Citizen Corps, 2009).  The significance of this finding cannot be understated; a 
household plan takes only moments to create and requires negligible resources.  Despite 
these almost nonexistent constraints, the majority of citizens have still not created basic 
plans.  This section will explore how and where incorporating the public into 
preparedness strategies can bolster the resilience of a community.   
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Engagement  
 A resilient community takes the time to develop plans, train and perform 
exercises in emergency management together.  Currently, a small group of individuals 
carries out these essential preparedness functions, while the majority of citizens are 
excluded.  To understand why, we need to establish some understanding of what works in 
engaging the public in preparedness.  There are three established practices (Mileti, 2011), 
that have helped create preparedness, to which this study would like to add two.  First, 
local individuals who have taken measures to prepare are the best representatives to 
encourage proactive communities, as opposed to celebrities or federal agencies.  Second, 
individuals need a pragmatic presentation illustrating what behaviors work, how to do 
them, and simple reasons why they should do them (opposed to scare tactics or overtly 
technical explanations).  Finally, these two factors need to be communicated consistently, 
repetitively, through varied channels and over a long temporal period to create impact.  
These three approaches represent a very different approach than has been taken by the 
federal government and the addition of two more approaches could increase success.  
These include incorporating the general public in disaster planning sessions and inviting 
them to participate in emergency exercises.   
 Planning 
 There is a very clear dichotomy between preparedness planning at the leadership 
level and at the individual level in our community.  In fact, most levels of government 
have participated in some degree of continuity planning, while most households have not.  
According to FEMA, emergency management planning brings together police and fire 
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departments, medical services, senior elected officials, public works, health 
representatives, business, and NGOs (EMI, IS- 235a).  These groups plan according to 
the response framework, assign responsibilities and lay out expectations for participants 
during an emergency.  At the household level, preparedness planning is best represented 
by the federal governments Ready.gov site.  This site has great information on how to 
make a plan, build a kit, and even how to get involved in your community.  The site also 
connects to social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter.  What this reflects is a 
passive form of one-way communication that bears no semblance to the diverse and 
engaging planning process completed by authorities.   
 Current planning processes have room for, and would benefit from, greater public 
participation.  The planning process described by FEMA has six basic steps: form a 
collaborative team, understand a situation, determine goals and objectives, develop plan; 
prepare, review, and approve plan; and refine and execute plan (EMI, IS-235a).  This 
planning process is similar to the larger policy processes that were detailed earlier, 
especially the understanding the problem and determining goals and objectives stages.  
Much like the earlier policy agenda-setting and formation stages, the public can help 
widen understanding, benefit from education, increase implementation speed, create 
political support, and legitimize efforts.  There is another essential element a 
collaborative effort between the general public and emergency planning groups  may 
provide, the building of pre-disaster plans that are not necessarily post-disaster response 
based.  For example, the most common message emergency manager’s voice is the need 
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for households to have a plan and 72-hour kit, something few households have.  In 
collaboration with the community, emergency managers could understand why many 
people have not prepared a kit and help plan out solutions.  A 72 hour kits is not cheap, 
especially during lean economic times, but if a plan was created for individuals to buy 
incrementally or buy in bulk with agency assistance, it is feasible even for socio-
economically vulnerable groups.  Emergency managers are typically focused on 
outcomes when dealing with the public, but the processes of reaching those goals is also 
essential to successful preparedness (King, Feltey, and Susel, 1998).   
In Practice 
 India provides an example of how participation in preparedness can be 
incorporated into the lives of citizens.  India has approximately one-third the territory of 
continental United States, but with nearly four times the population.  In an effort to utilize 
the human capital, the Indian government has created 169 community-based disaster 
programs.  Not only do the citizens engage in risk assessment, but also they are involved 
in the planning and exercise activities.  Readiness is maintained in villages by drills that 
test locally-developed plans, which are reevaluated and integrated laterally as well as 
with higher levels of government (Joseph and Chakrabarti, 2011).  India shares the 
characteristics of cultural diversity with its neighbor China.   
 A study conducted on the indigenous knowledge of  Nepal inhabitants revealed 
that cultural practices in various regions had deeply ingrained what we would identify as 
emergency management activities.  Researchers studying the culture elements of groups 
living in hazard prone areas found two key characteristics important for this study.  First, 
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traditional approaches to mitigation were not only effective, but they had been so 
ingrained in day-to-day activities that most people did not realize they were prepared for 
disasters.  Second, social structures, relationships, history, and institutional arrangements 
may be deeply instilled with preparedness considerations, unbeknownst to outsiders 
(Shaw, 2009).  Knowing local characteristics can have a dramatic impact on the success 
emergency management, something lost at the federal policy level.  Preparedness has 
historically been the duty of every citizen, only recently delegated to professionals.  
There is still much we can learn from the public’s involvement, as India and Nepal have 
shown, in preparing for disasters. 
Recommendation 
 Two administrative questions need to be asked (Thomas, 1995); first, is public 
assistance critical to implementation?  Second, do the relevant publics share agency 
goals?  For preparedness, the answer to both is yes.  Approaches involving the public in 
the preparedness planning process can take many forms, and extend well into emergency 
management exercises.  Public involvement in administration has some typical forms, 
including citizen advisory committees, public meetings and forums.  The problem with 
these approaches is three fold.  First, advisory committees are sparsely populated and 
rarely reflect a complex demographic.  Second, public meetings, reaching more 
individuals, are typically an informational one-way communication.  Public officials 
often unsuccessfully rely upon expert opinion, bountiful statistical data and graphic 
details to punctuate messages.  Third, forums and town halls often perform the catharsis 
function of airing public frustration to officials without clear policy objectives or 
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institutionalized accountably.  If presented as a goal, change is usually temporally distant 
or murky in implementation strategies.  Opposed to these typical participatory 
approaches, emergency managers have a method that builds knowledge, fleshes out 
problems, and engages diverse actors.  FEMA recommends the employment of five 
different styles of exercises: orientation, drills, tabletop, functional, and full-scale (EMI, 
IS-139a).  For the purpose of incorporating the general public, a community tabletop 
exercise would provide the optimal format for engaging the community.  These exercises 
are adequate because they can involve a large group of people, are relatively inexpensive, 
involve open-ended discussion, and are facilitator led and narrative based.  Tabletop 
exercises help clarify gaps in communications, responsibilities and knowledge existing 
between areas of the public and government.  The LEAP tabletop exercise, participated in 
by this research, had no specific questions it was trying to answer.  Rather, the intent was 
to help build questions community partners and emergency mangers could ask 
themselves and each other about their roles in disasters.   
Conclusion 
 The public represents a diverse and contentious assortment of groups and 
individuals, perceived as largely unmanageable.  This is exactly why the public has been 
shut out of emergency management policy processes.  It is this study's position that these 
public characteristics are also the characteristics of a resilient community.  The literature 
reviewed on disasters and participation illuminate the largely untapped strengths of 
public actors.  This chapter has isolated the upstream policy stages of agenda-setting and 
policy-formation as well as downstream areas of implementation, where the public could 
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benefit emergency management.  Agenda-setting in emergency management has largely 
been propagated by a policy monopoly at the federal level.  This created linear policy 
inept at dealing with “wicked” problems, in need of a devolution of responsibility and 
input.  Policy-formation too, lacks the essential balance required to create policy that best 
attends to the dynamic problems policy faces.  Without balance, policy denies the vast 
interdependences that bind a community together, bonds that save lives during response 
and accelerating recovery.  Implementation of under-employed mitigation and 
preparedness efforts can also benefit from greater participation.  Non-structural efforts 
such as education and partnership building can dramatically bolster mitigation efforts.  
Preparedness is not a phase to be practiced by first responders alone, as citizens are the 
true first responders.  In this case, citizens need to be engaged and included in planning 
processes.   
  Practicing the recommendations posited above, implemented to different degrees 
across the globe, can contribute community resilience.  A resilient community is more 
able to absorb the initial impact of a disaster through both structural and non-structural 
mitigation and planning for all stakeholders.  A resilient community has engaged the 
most vulnerable among its members and involved their planning considerations.  A 
resilient community is quicker to respond because citizens have taken measures of self-
help, and refuse to be victims.  Finally, a resilient community recovers more rapidly 
because it has already established dynamic interconnections described as social capital, 
deployed in force.  Unfortunately, at this moment most communities may only display a 
 Public Participation in Emergency Management  
 
130 
 
fraction of the characteristics we would identify as resilient, making them potential 
catastrophes.   
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Ch.5 Conclusion 
 
 For public managers, disasters represent the worst kind of problem, those referred 
to as “wicked.”  Policies crafted to combat “wicked” problems face great uncertainty 
involving  ramifications, are ingrained with moral ambiguities as well as often being 
created in a way that does not benefit (or even harms)  those affected by the initial 
problem.  The disaster that struck Japan on March 11, 2011 presented a case of cascading 
threats initiated by an earthquake, creating a tsunami, and sparking a nuclear meltdown.  
The United States faced Hurricane Katrina in 2005 with a newly reorganized bureaucratic 
structure and an early emergency declaration by President Bush.  Despite this, Hurricane 
Katrina is considered by many an epic failure of government, as well as being most costly 
disaster in American history.  These two examples illuminated the boundless 
unpredictably of disasters and the fact that they affect to a varying extent everyone in a 
community.  Recent policies have denied an active role for the public, and have thus 
hampered mitigation and preparedness in our communities.  
 The last decade has provided emergency management with the most rapid 
changes as it has professionalized, incorporated military organization, and centralized 
federal dominance at the local level.  Administratively these changes have required 
greater emphasis on managerial norms, top-down decision making and a Hamiltonian 
informational approach.  To accommodate the demands of rapid implementation, the 
eight stages of the policy process have been monopolized by elite federal actors at the 
cost of public and local input.  Accumulatively these efforts have created a consistent 
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national framework for leadership and first-responders, but the public is still woefully 
unprepared and predictably distrustful.   
 Incorporating the public requires its careful defining, identification of its 
characteristics and understanding the advantages and disadvantages of its inclusion.  John 
Dewey recognized an ideal public as one that identified issues facing it and confronted 
them with positive action; this public is absent today.  Local officials, media, social 
scientists, businesses, community associations, and individuals represent a disjointed and 
easily subordinated public, as far as emergence management prerogatives are concerned.  
Brought together in a dynamic-participatory-model, the public can benefit rational 
decision-making, add depth to knowledge, and bolster resilience through increases social 
capital.  These public attributes are lacking in emergency management policy today.  
Disasters represent a threat to every stakeholder in a community, without widespread 
input, a community cannot utilize the totality of its assets.    
 Careful consideration of where in the policy and administrative stages the public 
can be positively included is essential to maximizing emergency management’s mission.  
The public can benefit the agenda-setting policy stage through explorative workshops 
that facilitate greater disaster understanding for communities, leaders, and mangers alike.  
If included in policy-formation, the interdependencies intrinsic to public life can help 
balance political and bureaucratic demands that have so far commanded emergency 
management.  Administratively, structural-mitigation can be reinforced in the community 
by non-structural efforts to increase education and build partnerships.  Finally, 
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preparedness can reach new heights if the public can be included in tabletop exercises 
that address specific challenges.  The public, if included in the specific policy stages and 
administrate steps, can positively contribute to an increase in community resilience. 
 Public participation in policy and administration pose three general challenges to 
emergency managers.  First, public inclusion may increase temporal requirements to the 
point of inaction.  Second, dominate political processes and concerns may be disputed to 
the point of fracture.  Finally, administrative goals of rationality, expert knowledge, and 
efficiency may be subordinated.  Contrary to this understanding, FEMA’s mission to 
protect citizen’s lives and property from the effects of a disaster have been hampered by a 
distanced public.  In comparison to other administrative challenges, dealing with disasters 
necessitates the incorporation of governmental, social, individual, and cultural efforts to 
decrease costs in lives and property.  Challenges posed by the public’s introduction 
require balancing the degree of inclusion with areas in the policy process where benefits 
are expected.  As our society grows in population, social complexity and technological 
sophistication, the costs associated with disasters have increased, and it is time that our 
efforts to combat them do as well, by increasing public participation in emergency 
management.   
   
 
  
1
3
4
 
      Table 6 Recommendations for Public Participation in Emergency Management 
Policy Stages Levels of Governance 
 Local State Federal 
Agenda 
Setting 
Explorative Community Workshops  
Agenda reflecting community 
sensibilities expands policy 
knowledge, creates social capital, 
and promotes successful 
downstream efforts. 
State governments, congressional 
representatives and governors are provided 
impetus and feedback from engaged 
communities resulting in greater specificity in 
agenda and clearly articulated federal influence. 
Policy monopoly at the federal level 
devolved, allowing state and local input into 
agenda setting.  Agenda shaped by 
collaborative interests pays dividends in 
policy formation and downstream stages as 
more concerns are initially considered. 
Policy 
Formation 
Formative Community Consultations 
Local considerations involving 
capacity, social vulnerability, and 
culture contribute to broad policy 
form. 
State characteristics, beyond quantifiable 
measures, contribute to leader’s ability to 
engage federal policy.  State political actors can 
utilize public support to leverage federal 
institutions.   
Federal level policy retains technical 
soundness and resource accountably while 
increasing its political feasibly, and 
acceptability to public.  Federal resources 
diversified over all four emergency phases 
increases national capacity.   
Mitigation Public Mitigation Sessions 
Increase in contextual information 
bolsters risk assessment, shared 
responsibility and illuminates 
importance of partnerships in 
collaborative enterprises.   
Leaders and managers are provided greater 
insight into the dynamics of their communities, 
allowing for specific and well-suited federal 
assistance on mitigation efforts such as 
education, outreach, and building sustainable 
norms.   
Mitigation efforts developing at the local and 
state level offer greater opportunities for best 
practices and progressive national policy 
development.  Federal level cost savings can 
reduce deficit spending while maximizing 
impact.  Political leaders benefit from shared 
accountability.   
Preparedness Community Tabletop Exercises 
With little investment from 
managers and leadership, exercises 
can engage diverse community 
members, build knowledge about 
planning, and flesh out potential 
problems. 
State actors promoting prepared and resilient 
communities benefit from accelerated response 
and recovery from disasters while lessening their 
dependence on federal guidance and resources.   
State and local communities familiar with 
organizational characteristics complement 
federal command and control structures and 
more importantly are engaged in self-help, 
preparedness, and resiliency efforts.   
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Appendix 
The Public in Portland’s Emergency Management 
  
Introduction 
 Emergency managers are tasked with addressing the nonlinearity and ambiguous 
nature of “wicked” problems, and this thesis provides new ways to approach such 
predicaments.  While the recommendations may seem well outside the current norms of 
emergency management, foreign and domestic, they are not without precedent.  In this 
appendix, the emergency management community in Portland, Oregon will be considered 
in light of recommendations for greater public participation.  Portland leadership, initially 
hampered by federal policy domination, has since become powerfully proactive.  The 
first section will examine the cities transition from a limited participatory emergency 
management focus, to a more holistic and inclusive policy system.  The second section 
will provide a quick comparison of emergency management technological outreach by 
cities comparable to Portland.  This comparison will help place this study’s critique of 
general public participation in emergency management on a practical continuum.  
Finally, a former FEMA program called Project Impact will be briefly investigated to 
establish precedent for federal initiated devolution of emergency management, carried 
out in Portland.  The city of Portland is better protected today thanks to the efforts of 
emergency managers who have reached out to stakeholders in the community, and there 
are more to be reached.  Compared with other cities, Portland’s emergency management 
agency is alert, attentive, transparent, accountable, and actively engaging new ways to 
better the community.  Finally, the institutional shadow from Project Impact, of which we 
would be wise to revisit in efforts to increase our community’s resilience to disasters 
(Holderman and Patton, 2010).   
 
 
 
 
Public Participation in Emergency Management 
 
143 
 
Portland Bureau of Emergency Management, Oregon 
 The Portland Bureau of Emergency management (formerly Portland Office of 
Emergency Management) has been a continually evolving and constantly learning from 
both stumbles and successes.  Established in 2003, PBEM took over the managerial role 
of emergency coordination traditionally held by the fire and rescue departments.  The 
agency is largely funded by DHS grants [Ch.2] and supports approximately fifteen full-
time positions (City of Portland, Audit, 2010).  The agency is responsible for the 
implementation and coordination of the four-phases of emergency management: 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.  This section will reflect upon a 2010 
agency audit, which revealed a number of concerns, and areas improvement, drawn 
primarily from two audit objectives.  The first objective was to assess the current 
governance structure to ascertain if they were suitable to provide oversight for emergency 
management tasks.  The second objective was to determine the degree to which the 
agency had implemented policies affecting planning, training, education, response, and 
communication.  Response to the audit was not just swift, coming in the form of an 
update mitigation plan, but also expressed the proactive nature of the agency by way of a 
new strategic plan.  The Portland Bureau of Emergency Management stands as a very 
fine example of how public participation can be brought into governmental agencies, for 
the benefit of the entire community.  The topics of agenda setting, policy formation, 
mitigation, and preparedness will provide the topical framework by which PBEM will be 
discussed.   
 
Agenda Setting 
 The agenda setting process at the federal level [Ch.2] is one that involves only a 
marginal degree of public participation [Ch.3].  The repercussions of this, it has been 
posited, are the problematic implementation of policy for local authorities.  The early 
years PBEM may be a fine example of the problem that emerges from imposing an 
agenda that is not locally contributed to.  The audit of 2010 found that the first years of 
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the Portland agency were characterized best by two symptoms.  First, changes in 
directorship of the organization were frequent.  Second, the agency had failed to establish 
substantial working relationships with other agencies and partners (City of Portland, 
Audit, 2010).  One could readily understand the conflicts in jurisdiction and perceived 
power between agencies, only enhanced by a new agency imposed from the federal level.  
In a letter that prefaced the cities Basic Emergency Operations Plan of 2006, then Mayor 
Potter described the agencies three goals: to implement National Incident Management 
System, form committees, and create leadership councils (City of Portland, 2006).  This 
letter was a request to city agency managers for greater compliance and cooperation with 
the initiatives imposed on Portland through DHS grant requirements.  Unfortunately, the 
mayor’s letter was not sufficient in aligning other agencies and community partner’s 
cooperation, and the fledgling emergency bureau struggled. 
   The problem was ingrained in the top-down command and control focus of the 
federal plans themselves.  At root, the plans were not adequately flexible, preventing the 
start-up emergency management agency from acquainting itself with essential contextual 
details required to facilitate collaboration.  Despite this the agency did not rest 
complacently, as both recent mitigation and strategic plans show powerful corrections in 
behavior.  One clear goal of the Portland Strategic Plan of 2011-2013 initiates a 
holistically integrative planning process (City of Portland, Strategic plan, 2010).  This 
initiative establishes goals and methods to create collaborative planning partnerships with 
nearly all city agencies, in order develop partnerships.  Rather than dictating the agenda 
of local policy, the plan uses language that describes wider agency partnerships to 
determine shared goals and objectives.  These partnerships also establish mutually 
beneficial agendas, which in turn increase a policies chance efficient implementation, and 
long-term success, a lesson PBEM has taken to heart.  While this is a progressive step, 
there is still room for institutionalized public participation. 
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Policy-Formation  
 Early days of emergency management in Portland reflected a policy-formation 
process that nearly mirrored the federal processes, one with no public participation.  The 
letter from Mayor Potter, mentioned above, detailed the creation of two advisory 
committees that helped direct agency development.  The first committee consisted of the 
Mayor, President of the City Council, City Auditors, and key first-responder-agency 
directors.  The second committee was called the Emergency Management Committee and 
consisted of senior managers from each city bureau.  While it is not clear whether this 
was the case, it is fathomable these two committee efforts were hampered by very 
divergent ideas, goals and implementation abilities (as elected and unelected interest 
often do).  What the audit noted was a problematic lack of clear parameters and powers 
assigned to each committee, as well as the fact that their meetings were undocumented 
(City of Portland, Audit, 2010).  A lack of transparency and unclear powers of policy 
formation and implementation are exactly the forces that form national emergency 
management policy.  This closed system of policy formation excluded not only the 
general public but also disengaged agencies that could have contributed.  Local 
leadership, without malice, modeled their own committees and leadership after the 
federal government, which led to very poor performance.   
 Again the emergency managers in Portland did not entrench themselves in 
political or bureaucratic positions for their own sake, but rather proactively engaged 
solutions.  Following the audit, PBEM drew from community resources, as opposed to 
federal, and created a new Strategic Plan for the years 2011-13.  The impetus for a new 
direction in Portland emergency management came from the incorporation of numerous 
ideas and considerations drawn  from the 2010 Portland Audit, Emergency Management 
Accreditation Program,  the Portland Plan, other agencies strategic plans, budget 
committees, Portland CERT program Steering Committee and importantly from a town 
hall meeting held in SW Portland (City of Portland, Strategic Plan, 2010).  Although all 
the contributors are noted are essential, by and far the most unusual was the direct 
Public Participation in Emergency Management 
 
146 
 
inclusion of the public.  From the town hall meeting, the agency learned that citizens 
believe preparedness is a matter of having adequate supplies, but lack an understanding 
on how planning, training and exercises are involved.  Although the town hall was largely 
considered a failure, it did illuminate the lack of basic emergency information held by the 
public.  Policy formation must include considerations from those that may be 
inadvertently or indirectly involved (citizens), not just authoritative stakeholders (first 
responders).  PBEM took great steps to add participatory depth in the policy formation 
process, to the benefit of the larger community.    
Mitigation 
 The 2010 Mitigation Plan pushed the degree of public involvement and risk 
assessment to the next level.  Vulnerability of communities would now be illuminated by 
three methods; through greater technology, other agencies collaboration, and public 
outreach.  The final approach is most essential for this study, and unlike the vague 
participatory references found in previous plans, specific details and strategies for the 
implementation of public participation were presented.  These strategies are not just listed 
out, but factors that will help ensure their success are identified, including information 
on: prioritization, agencies that are responsible and can help coordinate, potential funding 
sources, time frames and  issues of cost effectiveness and feasibility (City of Portland, 
Mitigation Plan, 2010).  The 2010 Mitigation Plan is the product of a far wider group of 
individuals than its 2005 predecessor, which is reflected in the desire that the plan comes 
close to reaching that ‘comprehensive’ risk assessment goal that was mentioned, but not 
clearly articulated, by the Portland Audit.  The Strategic Plan that followed the Mitigation 
Plan of 2010 set a new standard by identifying a ‘whole community approach’ to 
mitigation.  The plan extended emergency management activities into the community and 
engages very specific groups and vulnerable populations (City of Portland, Strategic 
Plan, 2010).  One problem that emerges is grant funding for PBEM activities, as plans 
need to be judged by federal guidelines.  These guidelines, while broadly useful, are not 
impregnated with the flexibility that is needed for local implementation.  PBEM has 
Public Participation in Emergency Management 
 
147 
 
taken elements of the federal frameworks that work, like command structures, and 
balanced those that do not with a new emphasis on sustainably and resilience 
understanding.   
Preparedness 
 The 2010 Mitigation Plan, once again, revealed a thoughtful and pragmatic 
approach to creating greater preparedness in Portland.  At the heart of the program  lay 
the framework for future planning that deeply incorporated the involvement of city 
agencies, business and neighborhoods in readiness considerations (City of Portland, 
Mitigation Plan, 2010).  The Strategic Plan that followed would outline even greater 
levels of public engagement, of which three details will be discussed here.  First, as 
trained disaster first-responders the CERT team members will have greater input in both 
policy and administrative activities.  Second, in addition to general public preparedness 
activities, households will be targeted with clear information and given low-cost and 
practical preparedness goals.  Finally, community partners such as businesses and 
neighborhood associations were prioritized as essential participants for preparedness 
activities (City of Portland, Strategic Plan, 2010).  These three steps bring the larger 
community within an emergency management circle-of-understanding.  In the previous 
chapters the Portland LEAP exercise was presented an unadulterated example of how a 
agencies and the public can work together for preparedness.  The goals of that exercise 
did not to include arriving at hard conclusions, rather it intended to flesh out questions 
and illuminate the interdependences in the community.  The LEAP program is ongoing, 
and no doubt will provide valuable information to both emergency managers and the 
public at large as they collaborate on preparedness.   
 Emergency management in Portland, as in the rest of the US, was traditionally the 
responsibly of local first-responders in the fire departments.  When the PBEM was 
established in 2003 it was essentially an agency framed, paid for and directed from 
federal authorities.  This significantly hampered the young agencies ability to garner 
support, not just from the public, but also from other essential city agencies and 
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leadership.  Over the course of the subsequent years the professionals at PBEM addressed 
challenges and critiques very proactively, as opposed taking the position of denial or 
entrenchment.  Agenda-setting and policy-formation was initially conducted by a 
relatively small group of individuals, but has since opened to the general public to a 
degree.  This has facilitated far greater communication, shared responsibility, and 
partnerships that span across city agencies, into the private sector and finally engage 
neighborhoods at a growing rate.  Success of mitigation and preparedness activities in 
Portland should be bolstered, as stakeholders are able to better understand each other’s 
concerns and proficiencies.  While there is still plenty of room for the public in Portland 
emergency management, the steps that have been taken have increased the communities 
overall sustainability and resilience.  How these steps are unique to Portland and from 
what roots they emerge from will be the topic of the following sections.   
Public Information Comparison 
Introduction 
 This study has proposed that the levels of public participation in emergency 
management are critically absent, and that condition has contributed to overall lack of 
mitigation and low preparedness.  Public participation has been placed on a continuum 
[Ch.3] and measured against more efficiency-focused modes of governance.  The 
conclusion was reached that much of the public’s interaction with emergency 
management is informational, and thus not participatory.  While this conclusion is 
consistent with the findings concerning the small degree of participation in Portland, 
PBEM needs national comparisons.  Although providing the public with information is 
very distant from active participation, it is none-the-less very important.  By far the 
greatest informational resources available to citizens are provided via governmental 
websites, and this section will compare PBEM to four other cities along seven measures.  
The four cities (Louisville, Milwaukee, Las Vegas, Oklahoma) chosen for this 
comparison were done based on population size, and did not take into account any other 
variable.  This section is intended to anecdotally illuminate the wide range in content 
Public Participation in Emergency Management 
 
149 
 
offered by emergency management departments who received DHS grant funding 
(Digital Sandbox, 2011).  The seven variables include, allowance of feedback, agent 
contact information, availability of official plans, calendar of events, alerts, news, and 
finally a citizen involvement section.  All emergency management websites had some 
basic links to FEMA, as well as links to specific threats.  All seven measures  are present 
on the PBEM website and the national FEMA site, both of  which make for a rather 
engaging and enlightening experience (www.portlandonline.com/oem/; www. FEMA.gov). 
These seven variables help describe the informational context, transparency and 
governmental dedication to public interactions to bolster emergency management efforts.   
 
Table 7 Emergency Management Website Comparison of Cities Receiving DHS  Grants as of 2010 
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DHS 
Grants 
(Millions) 
Portland 
584,000 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes $7.18 
Louisville 
597,000 
Yes Yes 
 (EOP Only) 
No Yes No Yes Yes $2.2 
Milwaukee 
594,000 
Yes No No No Yes 
(Limited) 
Yes Yes $4.16 
Las Vegas 
580,000 
Yes No No Yes No No Yes $8.15 
Oklahoma City 
580,000 
Yes No No No No No Yes $4.4 
 
Louisville  
 Emergency managers in Louisville, Kentucky are represented  by a rather 
dynamic public website that maintains many of the features found on the PBEM site.  
Louisville, as of 2010, had a population of approximately 597,000 compared to 
Portland’s 584,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).  The first category of comparison is 
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whether the Louisville Emergency Management Office has contact information and has 
encouraged feedback (Louisvilleky.gov/ema).  The website has a clear link to information 
on individual contacts (names/responsibilities) within the agency but no specific contact 
numbers or emails for the six employees.  In addition, there is only an agency general 
phone number, with no general email by which comments or questions may be addressed.  
The second area of consideration involves public access to emergency related plans, 
including emergency operations plans, mitigation plans, and strategic plans.  Louisville 
has released the city’s rather detailed and thorough emergency operations plan.  The plan 
outlines agency responsibilities, communications, hazard analysis, mutual assistance 
agreements, emergency operations command details, command systems and mass care 
instructions; just to name a few chapters of this 338-page document (Louisville, 2010).  
What is missing from the planning in Louisville is a long-term plan to address hazards 
with a mitigation and preparedness strategy.  The third area of inquiry is the inclusion of 
an agency calendar of events for the public to consult, while there is a link there are no 
agency activities listed.  The presence of an alternative alert system in Louisville, based 
on text messages, emails, and phones calls, successfully fulfills the fourth measure.  The 
fifth element that is important to have on a website is updated news on agency, weather, 
and federal activities.  The same situation exists in the news section as involved the 
calendar, there is a link, but it is without content.  The sixth category is one that can 
involve the citizen directly in activities.  The Louisville website has numerous 
informational links as well as links on how to serve on city boards and commissions, but 
nothing specific to agency engagement or CERT programs.  As far as the considerations 
of this section are concerned, the Louisville Emergency Management Agency website is 
a reasonably good source of information, offers a degree of transparency, and illuminates 
the dedicated work of emergency managers.  Where the website falters is the lack of 
event calendars and news, which can be invaluable to citizens who wish to be prepared 
and participate in community activities.   
 
Public Participation in Emergency Management 
 
151 
 
Milwaukee  
 Emergency managers in Milwaukee, Wisconsin have put together a website that 
provides substantially less information and opportunity than comparable cities.  The 
Milwaukee Emergency Management and Homeland Security Office is responsible for a 
population of approximately 594,000 as of 2010, which is slightly less than Louisville but 
three-thousand more than Portland (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).  As far as the first 
category is concerned, contacts and feedback, the Milwaukie agency very much succeeds.  
The agency has general phone, fax, and email information, as well as the phone numbers 
and email addresses for the five members of the agency 
(City.milwaukee.gov/OfficeofHomelandSecurity).  The second variable to be weighted 
involves the websites presentation of city emergency plans, in Milwaukee the public is 
not provided those via the website.  The presence of an agency calendar is the third factor 
considered, and here we find a general city government link but none dedicated to 
emergency management specifically.  The forth element explores the incorporation of an 
alternate emergency alert system, here again the city is lacking any dedicated system or 
links to social media sights such as twitter or Facebook.   
 The presentation of emergency management specific news is an important way of 
keeping the public up-to-date on activities and threats.  While the news is present on the 
Milwaukee website, it is either very dated (almost a year old) or provides non-functioning 
links.  The finally category detailed here involves links for citizens who want to be 
prepared or involved.  Here the website provides information on personal preparedness as 
well as links to resources and volunteer organizations such as Citizens and Organizations 
Active in Disasters.  The informational website created by the Milwaukee government 
represents a decline from Louisville in planning information, transparency, and overall 
emergency management dedication to public interaction.  One cause of this is the 
splitting of effort between emergency concerns and those of security.  Funding from the 
federal grants come with  security spending stipulations, which would explain the 
combination police office in Milwaukee, as it would keep those funds under the same 
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roof.  Overall, the website is far less successful than Louisville and Portland in providing 
the citizenry with the information and opportunities they need to mitigate and prepare for 
disasters.  
Las Vegas 
 Las Vegas emergency managers are represented by a site reflecting a relatively 
minor extension of city government.  Despite the lacking website, the emergency 
managers have approximately 584,000 citizens to plan for, an almost identical population 
to Portland (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).  The website itself provides the very minimum 
of contact information for the agency, with only an office address, phone number and 
general email.  Agency members and their specific information are not provided.  The 
second variable considered is public access to emergency plans, and Las Vegas is an 
outlier.  While a link to the city's emergency operations plan is presented, what is 
provided is a notice that state law requires plan to remain confidential (City of Las Vegas, 
2011).  Contained in the notice is a reference to Nevada state code, which stipulates that 
cities must file very skeletal plans with the state (compared to very comprehensive plans 
created in Louisville and Portland).  The website has no calendar or news to inform the 
public.  The site does provide links to CERT training, FEMA, and Citizen Corps.  
Information used for citizen preparedness is incredibly limited; indicating that families 
need 72-hour kits and plans but not describing contents or reasons why the kits are 
important.  On a positive note, the website is connected to telephone alert system that 
serves all southern Nevada.  The website serving the Las Vegas community can be 
described as very limited.  Information is sparse, transparency is almost non-existent, and 
dedicated public interaction with emergency management seems to be dismally, if not a 
distant secondary concern to security.  Overall, the website contributes far less to 
emergency management concerns compared with other cities. 
Oklahoma City 
 The website maintained by the Oklahoma City Emergency Management Office 
offers the least amount of information, transparency, and dedicated effort of any city in 
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this study.  Oklahoma City, Oklahoma is a community of 580,000 citizens, which makes 
it the least populated city, four thousand people less than Portland (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2012).  The first, and only, category that is fulfilled by the Oklahoma emergency website 
involves contacts and feedback.  On the mail page, the agency presents an address, phone 
number and email in which citizens are invited to make comments and suggestions 
(Okc.gov).   
 As an extension of the police department, it is obvious that emergency 
management holds an obscured secondary position to security concerns.  The website 
offers no plans, calendars, alerts, or news.  Very basic information on tornados, floods, 
chemical spills, explosions, lightning, and winter storms is provided, but limited response 
and preparedness details are available.  The real depth of emergency management 
information and transparency is divided between the Oklahoma State Emergency Office 
and the Oklahoma City-County Health Department.  Respectively, these two websites do 
offer similar level of detail to Louisville, including; emergency plans, contact 
information, calendars, alerts, news, and information on what citizens can do.  
Emergency management in Oklahoma City provides a basic website that helps citizens 
connect to more informed websites created by the state and health departments.  As local 
citizens, these linked resources don’t help build an understanding of local concerns, 
responsibilities and activities.  Rather than having informed citizens familiar with local 
command and control structures, public works priorities and health concerns; the 
community in Oklahoma City has the potential to become very chaotic during a disaster.  
Overall, the emergency management website offers very little local information and 
transparency to which the efforts of mitigation and preparedness could be built upon.   
Conclusion 
 In many communities, the website that emergency managers maintain may be the 
only interface they have with the general public.  The brief exploration of four cities that 
are comparable to Portland have illuminated a very wide range of content.  At one end of 
the spectrum Portland and Louisville present sites that communicate a great deal of 
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information including emergency plans, calendars, alerts, news and agency contacts.  The 
presence of these items allows the public to glean a very thorough understanding of both 
emergency management and their personal role in government’s attempts to mitigate, 
prepare, respond and recovery from disasters.  The other end of the spectrum represents 
emergency management offices, which have minimally followed the FEMA definition 
for information provisions, as follows:  
“The amount of public involvement will vary by project and 
applicant.  Adequate public involvement is determined by various 
factors which include but are not limited to size of population 
affected, dollar amount of project, geographic area size, and 
potential for controversy” (U.S. Depart of Homeland Security, 
New Orleans).  
 
The wide range informational elements present a problem for the average citizen, who 
may have to engage multiple authorities to gain basic emergency management 
information.  A worse scenario, citizens looking for information get confused and 
discouraged by poorly maintained and populated websites, adding to the forces already 
promoting their disengagement from mitigation and preparedness.  The PBEM offers 
citizens not only a plethora of information, but importantly they are presented in many 
different formats.  With a single click of a mouse, a user can contact local authorities, 
find the next emergency management community activity, or request a presentation for 
their organization or business.  Although this study would contend that providing 
information is not nearly enough to facilitate greater public participation in mitigation 
and preparedness, it is a very necessary requirement.  With that in mind, local 
communities may look to the PBEM website as a successful example of how to 
communicate information, transparency, and dedication to public outreach in reaching 
emergency management goals.     
Project Impact Portland, Oregon 
 Project Impact initiated a small revolution in the way the emergency managers 
conducted their duties and engaged the public, and Portland is evidence of this (Project 
Impact Guide, 1997).  It took approximately two years, but in 1999, Multnomah County 
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and Portland signed a Project Impact Partnership Agreement (FEMA, 1999).  Present at 
the ceremony were representatives from local government, community groups, 
businesses and nonprofit organizations.  Within this initial agreement, the partners 
prioritized five immediate activities: establish a flood hazard community rating system, 
developed business and industry continuity plans, provide flood hazard information for 
homeowners and business, created primary school based educational programs, and 
finally form neighborhood emergency response teams.  It is obvious that some of these 
initiatives were successful implemented in Portland, the fact that this researcher is also a 
Neighborhood Emergency Team member is evidence.  Also evident is that PBEM is still 
developing the kind of partnerships that Project Impact called for, but with less assistance 
and collaborative benefits provided by the federal government.   
Conclusion 
 The problems that emergency managers face in a community are those that can 
have dramatic impacts on all stakeholders, and thus should involve them.  Portland, 
Oregon created its first dedicated emergency management office in 2003 amidst a major 
reorganization of FEMA under the Department of Homeland Security.  While grant 
funding from DHS helped pay for and establish the PBEM, the agency’s initial years 
were marred by lack of leadership and vacant partnerships.  This was due in part to rigid 
frameworks, requirements, and organizational examples emerging from the federal 
government.  Rather than deny the problems, the agency proactively engaged fellow 
agencies and the community at large to maximize its potential.  The Portland Strategic 
Plan of 2010 presents a series of steps the agency is planning to take to make Portland a 
safer place, through greater public participation in mitigation and preparedness activities.  
Indeed, PBEM efforts are to be commended but it should be acknowledged that an even 
greater role for the general public are implementable.  These include conducting general 
goal shaping workshops with the public; allowing neighborhood specificity in policy 
formation; conducting mitigation planning in a collaborative manner; and finally 
conducting tabletop exercises with the community to bring participation to fruition.   
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 This appendix put Portland on a continuum of cities that meet minimal levels of 
public engagement, providing information.  Websites represent a powerfully accessible 
tool for emergency managers to not only inform the community, but also directly involve 
them.  As was demonstrated, emergency management websites have a very wide range of 
success in elements such as allowing feedback, providing access to city plans, updated 
calendars, operation alert systems, news and ways citizens can get involved.  Portland 
and Louisville represent emergency managers who provided their communities with great 
sites.  Finally, this appendix established precedents of federal emergency management 
programing that emphasized devolution, local judgment, and community engagement.  
Project Impact, while short lived, empowered communities like Portland and fortified 
their local foundations, the effects of which are still visible today.   
